Zelensky rejected peace offer days before Russian offensive – WSJ

NATO did not bluff. They rejected Ukraine's entry into it. They are not a member of NATO but the board commies are bleating about NATO, over and over. Russia has expanded many times in the past and has done it lately too. Now they want Ukraine. All the NATO countries can recognize what a threat Putin and Russia are, so they are trying somewhat to help Zelensky fight off the aggressor. They think they may be next.
Putin is killing and wounding Ukraine's citizenry and destroying their homes. Many nations are helping those people. Putin wants to kill them.
 
NATO is "hostile" to the idea of Russia imposing its will on other countries. To Putin-ites like anatta that's all the hostility you need.
you mean NATO imposing it's agenda on Ukraine
and yes having a hostile governemnt with advanced weapons on Russia's border is "all you need"
 
I don't think they're sympathetic to what Russia is doing. No one is advocating Uk surrender.
More lamenting about the failed foreign policy mistakes - and there were many.
And here we are.
It will take time, loss of life and destruction before this resolves itself in the relative short run.
In the long run?
deliberative policy "mistakes" it was well understood what the neocons and Russiaphobes were doing
"poke the bear" /demean the bear /screw the bear - then the bear swatted back and the chickenhawks run around and say . "look what Putin did"
Again not to excuse Putin, but he'snot some deranged psychopath like we try to characterize him
 
I didn't think this was a difficult question...
Yes. But Ukraine wasn't a sovereign independent nation when Manafort installed Putin's puppet govt.. Which is why NATO kept rejecting them. Then Putin installed trump in the U.S, and he thought he was home free.

In Helsinki, they discussed Putin's plan in private. Then trump came to the lectern and announced to the world that the U.S sides with Putin, over its own intelligence agencies. Putin admitted that he wanted trump elected, and helped to achieve that.
 
I didn't think this was a difficult question...
you act like if Mexico joined the Chinese "Belt and Road" we should just say " well Mexico is sovereign"

FFSake look up Monroe Doctrine - get a clue as to that geopolitics and apply it to the Russian sphere
 
you act like if Mexico joined the Chinese "Belt and Road" we should just say " well Mexico is sovereign"

FFSake look up Monroe Doctrine - get a clue as to that geopolitics and apply it to the Russian sphere

Or if Cuba would host Russian missiles.
 
you act like if Mexico joined the Chinese "Belt and Road" we should just say " well Mexico is sovereign"

FFSake look up Monroe Doctrine - get a clue as to that geopolitics and apply it to the Russian sphere

A poor comparison. But Mexico IS sovereign, and we would not invade them or take aggressive action.

There is zero excuse for Putin's actions here. This is not a war of self-defense for Russia, as you are trying to spin.
 
The OP's standard response when it's correctly pointed out that the Ukraine can choose its own alliances, as a free & independent nation: "learn the geopolitics."
 
A poor comparison. But Mexico IS sovereign, and we would not invade them or take aggressive action.

There is zero excuse for Putin's actions here. This is not a war of self-defense for Russia, as you are trying to spin.
so you still dont undersatnad "sovereign"has nothing to do with Monroe Doctrine

we would not invade??? (Mexico scenario) WTF??
we invaded Afghan. and Iraq over much less and bombed Qadaffi for even less
I didn't call it" a war of self defense" - now you are reduced to making shit up
 
so you still dont undersatnad "sovereign"has nothing to do with Monroe Doctrine

we would not invade??? (Mexico scenario) WTF??
we invaded Afghan. and Iraq over much less and bombed Qadaffi for even less
I didn't call it" a war of self defense" - now you are reduced to making shit up

If you don't think that this thread or your posts in general imply that this is self-defense for Putin, I really don't know what to tell you.
 
Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election. Mr. Putin let the U.S. know in advance who should win.

When White House national security adviser Condoleezza Rice visited Mr. Putin at his dacha outside Moscow in May that year, the Russian leader introduced her to Ukrainian presidential contender Viktor Yanukovych. Ms. Rice concluded that Mr. Putin had arranged the surprise encounter to signal his close interest in the election’s outcome, she recalled in a recent interview.

Mr. Yanukovych’s initial election victory was marred by allegations of fraud and voter intimidation, triggering weeks of street protests and strikes that were dubbed the Orange Revolution. Ukraine’s supreme court ordered a new vote, which pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko won.
The Kremlin saw the Orange Revolution as U.S.-sponsored destabilization aimed at pulling Ukraine out of Moscow’s orbit—and as a prelude to a similar campaign in Russia itself.

To ease Moscow’s concerns, the Bush administration outlined the limited financial support it had given to Ukrainian media and nongovernmental organizations in the name of promoting democratic values.

It totaled $14 million. The White House thought the modest sum was consistent with Mr. Bush’s “freedom agenda” of supporting democracy but hardly enough to change the course of history.

The gesture only confirmed Russian suspicions. “They were impressed at the result that they thought we got for $14 million,” recalled Tom Graham, the senior director for Russia on Mr. Bush’s National Security Council.
Three months after losing Ukraine’s government to a pro-Western president, Mr. Putin decried the breakup of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

U.S. intelligence learned in 2005 that Mr. Putin’s government had carried out a broad review of Russian policy in the “near abroad,” as the Kremlin termed former Soviet republics. From now on, Russia would take a more assertive approach and vigorously contest perceived U.S. influence.
 
Ukrainian officials heard the message too. When President Yushchenko’s chief of staff, Oleh Rybachuk, visited the Kremlin in November 2005, he discussed the Orange Revolution with Mr. Putin. Mr. Rybachuk described the street protests as an indigenous movement of Ukrainians who wanted to choose their own political course.

Mr. Putin brusquely dismissed the notion as nonsense. He said he had read all of his intelligence services’ reports and knew the movement had been orchestrated by the U.S., the EU and George Soros, Mr. Rybachuck recalled in an interview.

At a separate encounter, Mr. Bush asked Mr. Putin why he thought the end of the Soviet Union had been the greatest tragedy of the 20th century. Surely the deaths of more than 20 million Soviet citizens in World War II was worse, Mr. Bush said. Mr. Putin replied that the USSR’s demise was worse because it had left 25 million Russians outside the Russian Federation, according to Ms. Rice, who was present.

Mr. Putin showed another face to Western European interlocutors, however, encouraging them to believe that he wanted Russia to be part of the wider European family. Soon after becoming president, he wowed Germany’s Parliament with a speech promising to build a strong Russian democracy and work with the West. Speaking in fluent German, perfected while he was a KGB officer in the former East Germany, he declared: “The Cold War is over.”

Mr. Putin was personally active in facilitating good economic relations, recalled longtime German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger. In one meeting, the issue of bureaucratic obstacles to German purchases of Russian wood came up. Mr. Putin phoned the relevant minister and resolved the matter in minutes.
“Putin said ‘Right, problem solved—what’s next?’ ” Mr. Ischinger remembered.
 
Perceptions changed in January 2007, when Mr. Putin vented his growing frustrations about the West at the annual Munich Security Conference.
In a long and icy speech, he denounced the U.S. for trying to rule a unipolar world by force, accused NATO of breaking promises by expanding into Europe’s east, and called the West hypocritical for lecturing Russia about democracy. A chill descended on the audience of Western diplomats and politicians at the luxury Hotel Bayerischer Hof, participants recalled.

“We didn’t take the speech as seriously as we should have,” said Mr. Ischinger. “It takes two to tango, and Mr. Putin didn’t want to tango any more.”



Mr. Putin’s demeanor with pro-Western leaders became more aggressive. In a meeting with a Balkan head of state during an energy summit in Croatia, Mr. Putin railed against NATO and called its severing of Kosovo from Serbia the greatest violation of international law in recent history. Years later, he would cite Kosovo as a precedent for seizing Crimea from Ukraine.
His rage rising, Mr. Putin rattled through grievances. He shouted expletives at his translator, who was struggling to keep up.
“The room fell silent. It was incredibly awkward: The president of the mighty Russian Federation was bullying a mere interpreter trying to do their job,” one participant said.
 
I need a MAP. We need to give the Ukrainian people a strategic focus on the way ahead. We really need this,” Mr. Yushchenko said, Ms. Rice recalled.
Ms. Rice, who was initially uncertain about having Ukraine in NATO, gave a noncommittal answer. When the request was debated in the National Security Council, Mr. Bush said NATO should be open to all countries that qualify and want to join.

A NATO summit was set for April 2008 in Bucharest, in the vast Palace of the Parliament built for Romania’s former Communist dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu. The alliance’s summits are usually well scripted in advance. Try as it might, the White House couldn’t overcome German and French resistance to offering a MAP to Ukraine and Georgia.
Berlin and Paris pointed to unsolved territorial conflicts in Georgia, low public support for NATO in Ukraine, and the weakness of democracy and the rule of law in both.

Ms. Merkel, remembering Mr. Putin’s speech in Munich, believed he would see NATO invitations as a direct and deliberate threat to him, according to Christoph Heusgen, her chief diplomatic adviser at the time.
She was also convinced Ukraine and Georgia would bring NATO no benefits as members, Mr. Heusgen said.
Ms. Merkel told Mr. Putin in advance that NATO wouldn’t invite Ukraine and Georgia to join, because the alliance was split on the issue, but the Russian leader remained nervous, Mr. Heusgen recalled.


As the NATO summit approached, Mr. Bush held a videoconference with Ms. Merkel, but it soon became clear that no consensus would be reached beforehand.
“Looks like a shootout at the OK Corral,” Mr. Bush said, according to James Jeffrey, the president’s deputy national security adviser at the time.
Ms. Merkel was flummoxed by the American reference and turned to her interpreter, who confessed that he, too, had no idea what the U.S. president meant.
Over dinner in Bucharest, Mr. Bush made his case for giving Ukraine and Georgia a MAP—to no avail. The next day, Ms. Rice and national security adviser Stephen Hadley tried to find a compromise with their German and French counterparts.
Ms. Rice, a Soviet and Russia expert, said Mr. Putin wanted to use Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia to rebuild Russia’s global power, and that extending the shield of NATO membership could be the last chance to stop him. German and French officials were skeptical, believing Russia’s economy was too weak and dependent on Western technology to become a serious threat again.

In the final session, Ms. Merkel debated in a corner of the room with leaders from Poland and other eastern members of NATO, who advocated strenuously on behalf of Ukraine and Georgia. Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus strongly criticized Ms. Merkel’s stance, warning that a failure to stop Russia’s resurgence would eventually threaten the eastern flank of the alliance.
 
Mr. Yushchenko slumped to 5% of the vote in Ukraine’s 2010 presidential elections. Mr. Yanukovych won—fairly this time, said international observers—after campaigning for friendly relations with the West and also Russia. He found it was difficult to have both.

Mr. Yanukovych negotiated a free-trade agreement with the EU. At the same time, however, he was under pressure from Mr. Putin to join a customs union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. EU officials said Kyiv couldn’t do both, because the customs rules would clash.

The EU, following its standard playbook on trade and governance, demanded that Ukraine revamp its judiciary and improve the rule of law as a precondition for a trade deal. Russia used sticks and carrots: At various moments it blocked goods imports from Ukraine, but it also offered Kyiv cheaper gas prices and a $15 billion loan.

In November 2013, Kyiv abruptly suspended talks with the EU, citing Russian pressure. Mr. Putin called the draft EU-Ukraine deal a “major threat” to Russia’s economy.

At an EU summit in Lithuania, Mr. Yanukovych defended the suspension and asked the EU to include Moscow in a three-way negotiation about the deal. EU leaders replied that letting a third party infringe on others’ sovereignty was unacceptable.

“We expected more,” Ms. Merkel sternly told Mr. Yanukovych in a conversation caught on camera.
“We have great problems with Moscow,” Mr. Yanukovych replied. “I have been left alone for 3½ years in very unequal circumstances with Russia,” he said.

Antigovernment protests spread across Ukraine that winter. The largest were on Kyiv’s central Independence Square, known locally as the Maidan. To the protesters, the EU association agreement was more than a trade deal: It expressed hopes of reorienting Ukraine toward the more democratic and prosperous part of Europe.
Clashes with riot police became frequent. In February 2014, police killed dozens of protesters in one day, sparking defections among Mr. Yanukovych’s political allies.

On Feb. 21, a group of EU foreign ministers brokered a power-sharing deal between Ukraine’s government and parliamentary opposition aimed at defusing the crisis. But the massive crowd on the Maidan booed the agreement and demanded Mr. Yanukovych’s resignation. Riot police melted away from central Kyiv as they sensed power, and political cover, slipping away.

The beleaguered Mr. Yanukovych sat in his office with Colonel General Sergei Beseda of Russia’s FSB, successor to the KGB, who had been dispatched by Mr. Putin to help quell the revolt. Gen. Beseda told Mr. Yanukovych that armed protesters were planning to kill him and his family, and that he should deploy the army and crush them, according to Ukrainian intelligence officers familiar with the conversation.
Instead, Mr. Yanukovych soon fled from Kyiv in a helicopter.

The Kremlin saw the turn of events as a coup by U.S. puppets and anti-Russian nationalists. In support of this view, Kremlin propagandists cited a video of two U.S. diplomats handing out cookies on Maidan to protesters and police after a night of clashes. Russian intelligence later leaked a recorded phone call in which the same two U.S. officials discussed who should be in the next Ukrainian government.
https://archive.ph/noYr0#selection-971.0-1039.406
 
On that subject, it's curious the number of Trumpers sympathetic to Russia right now.

moon is the only one on this board I see as openly supporting Russia but he’s an oddball supporting terrorists as well. Didn’t know he was a “trumped”. I’ll pay more attention.
 
massively long -see more at link.
WSJ puts in a lot of hawkish perspective, but it's a very good summation of events
 
moon is the only one on this board I see as openly supporting Russia but he’s an oddball supporting terrorists as well. Didn’t know he was a “trumped”. I’ll pay more attention.

You have comprehension problems. I'm simply supporting the Russians' right to a voice- which they have, along with perfectly sound reasons for neutralizing Ukraine. That's not ' support '

I don't support terrorists either. In your confusion you think that the invaded Palestinians are the ' terrorists ' and the Israeli fascists are not.

Is there hope for you ? Who cares.
 
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