Jihadists Syria rebels pledge loyalty to Qaeda groups

annata said:
Hundreds of rebels have pledged allegiance to al Qaeda-affiliated forces in northern and eastern Syria, activists and Islamist sources said on Friday, strengthening the group's control in the region.

Not only individual fighters, but entire units have joined the small but powerful al Qaeda-linked groups - the Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) - in recent days, according to the sources inside Syria.

"This is a sign the radical groups are still growing in power. This region could fall to the jihadists," said an activist in the eastern town of Raqqa, who asked not to be identified. "We may see this become a trend."

Clashes have been intensifying between Nusra or ISIL and the less effective but more moderate forces that make up the majority of opposition fighters, especially in opposition-held territory along Syria's northern and eastern borders.

At least two entire rebel brigades are said to have joined the Nusra Front in the opposition-held province of Raqqa, which borders Turkey. One of the groups, the Raqqa Revolutionaries, has about 750 fighters in total, according to a source close to Islamist forces who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Another group, the God's Victory Brigade, said in a statement on Facebook that all of its leaders and fighters had pledged loyalty to Nusra Front.

"God's Victory Brigade, which is comprise of 15 battalions, had pledged its allegiance to the Nusra Front, giving complete submission (to it) in times of hardship and of ease," it said.

A video uploaded by activists from Raqqa on Friday showed a massive convoy of fighters on cars and trucks with artillery and machine guns as they waved black flags. The video's title said it showed a newly unified force of Nusra fighters and other rebel battalions who had recently pledged loyalty.

Western forces have been wary of giving further support or weapons to opposition forces who are not only plagued by internal divisions, but the rising influence of al Qaeda groups.

Sporadic clashes between harder-line Islamists and more moderate rebels are increasingly frequent and activists fear that is weakening the two-and-a-half-year revolt against President Bashar al-Assad. The uprising began as peaceful protests against four decades of Assad family rule but has degenerated into a war that has killed more than 100,000.

While some tensions stem from contrasting ideological outlooks, most rebel-on-rebel fighting is more about control of territory and the spoils of war.

Some activists said the new Islamist loyalty pledges were timed to combat increasing hostility from rival rebel groups, including the Supreme Military Council, the armed wing of the opposition's Western-backed umbrella leadership abroad.

Many Syrian rebels are attracted to radical units because they are generally more effective than the moderate forces that have Western backing but receive only halting military aid.

Islamists have steady, private sources of funding and incorporate experienced militants, many of them from abroad, who have fought U.S. forces in Iraq or Afghanistan
http://news.yahoo.com/hundreds-syria-rebels-pledge-loyalty-qaeda-groups-activists-121713412.html
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What does that mean, "Al Qaeda affiliated"?
 
annata said:
the title OP is a bit misleading, yes - it was meant to show the increasing power of the jihadists vs. the so called moderates (like the Free Syrian Army).
What is happening is the jihadist are becoming the preeminent force among the Sunnis; even though the moderates still out number them
this among other reasons :
Click to expand...

And that is the reason we, America, wanted a hand in who was the most powerful group among the rebels, we don't want the jihadist's to be the main opposition.
 
Jarod said:
What does that mean, "Al Qaeda affiliated"?
Click to expand...

affiliates are more splinter groups, not aligned directly with AQ in AfPak (Zawahiri), but can be cobbled together when called for.

Remember the recent closing of the US Embassys in the ME? It was because of "chatter" with Zawahiri - (primarily AQAP)

here is some context:

Al-Qaeda-affiliated rebel groups clash in Syria: NGO
http://www.arabnews.com/news/465487
 
annata said:
affiliates are more splinter groups, not aligned directly with AQ in AfPak (Zawahiri), but can be cobbled together when called for.

Remember the recent closing of the US Embassys in the ME? It was because of "chatter" with Zawahiri - (primarily AQAP)

here is some context:

Al-Qaeda-affiliated rebel groups clash in Syria: NGO
http://www.arabnews.com/news/465487
Click to expand...

Ok, thanks. That's not enough of an affiliation that I would automatically believe they are at odds without interests.
 
So, basically any Middle Eastern fighting force not under the direct control of a secular government is Al Qaeda affiliated?
 
Jarod said:
So, basically any Middle Eastern fighting force not under the direct control of a secular government is Al Qaeda affiliated?
Click to expand...
There has to be an ideological tie to basic AQ tenets. Take the al-Shaabab atack in Kenya - while it is about local interest ( and I worked all weekend not up on it).

There is also the growing ties to US jihadists whom might have been there, as well as AQ proper.

The danger is the splinter groups, are becoming more organized / more "affiliated" / more able to co-ordinate - even though for the most part they stay localized.

Look at the history of Al_Sabaab, and how they had virtually no ties to AQ proper in the begining, but have grwon into an "AQ affiliate"

http://www.arabnews.com/news/465487
 
annata said:
There has to be an ideological tie to basic AQ tenets. Take the al-Shaabab atack in Kenya - while it is about local interest ( and I worked all weekend not up on it).

There is also the growing ties to US jihadists whom might have been there, as well as AQ proper.

The danger is the splinter groups, are becoming more organized / more "affiliated" / more able to co-ordinate - even though for the most part they stay localized.

Look at the history of Al_Sabaab, and how they had virtually no ties to AQ proper in the begining, but have grwon into an "AQ affiliate"

http://www.arabnews.com/news/465487
Click to expand...

So the deeper question, and what really matters to me is, what is that affiliation. What is the connection, not all "affiliations" are against U.S. interests.
 
Jarod said:
So the deeper question, and what really matters to me is, what is that affiliation. What is the connection, not all "affiliations" are against U.S. interests.
Click to expand...
by definition AQ affiliates are agianst western/US interests

While the Pakistan-based core has been degraded, AQ's regional offshoots have adapted to US pressure, evolving into a resilient and potent network

http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/a-new-framework-for-defining-al-qaeda/

Aren’t we dealing with al Qaeda remnants at this point?
While the Pakistan-based al Qaeda core that masterminded the USS Cole, 9/11, Madrid, and London attacks has been significantly weakened, the threat from the broader network remains acute, as the recent spate of embassy closings across the Middle East attests. The balance of power between center and periphery has clearly shifted as the network has adapted to increased pressure, and American strategy must shift with it.

► Does it really matter how we label the network?
Unfortunately, the target of the "war on terror" has always been somewhat fuzzy. A successful strategy must be based on a true understanding of the network that has been the most lethal enemy of the United States since the end of the Cold War. Clear definitions will permit critical evaluations of the intents and capabilities of al Qaeda affiliates from Mali to Yemen to Somalia. Otherwise, the US will merely engage in tactical battles without any real prospect of winning the larger war.

► What’s the biggest misconception about al Qaeda today?
Policymakers often fall into the trap of relying on a narrow and static range of indicators to assess the threat of a particular group. The al Qaeda network is adaptive and complex: there is an organizational structure within the network and within individual groups, but there are also human networks that cut across the formal structure. Policymakers must recognize that the growing affiliate-to-affiliate links and core-like behavior of many groups pose new threats to US national security interests.

► Does this mean our strategy is wrong?
Our strategy is premised on a bad model. Policymakers must begin to undertake what will be a substantial effort to develop a strategy that is both global and tailored to AQ's local associates and affiliates. Nonetheless, the argument to include associated groups within the al Qaeda network does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the US must deploy forces wherever the al Qaeda network is active.
 
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