Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی
Oh, you are correct. If the Strait of Hormuz is closed, and we want to get a bit of fuel out by the pipelines across Saudi Arabia, then we definitely need Bab-el-Mandeb.
I meant that if the Strait of Hormuz is open, we do not need Bab-el-Mandeb/Suez Canal. It certainly is very nice, but not irreplaceable.
trump has given Iran a crash course in how to hold the world ransom, and he does not seem to have any solution.
Every move of trump seems calculated to create significant price increases.
Trump has miscalculated from start to finish.
Referencing pipeline usage to avoid the Strait of Hormuz, that is not an adequate replacement for Gulf producers.
because existing pipelines are far smaller, fewer, and less flexible than the maritime corridor through Hormuz, and they can’t quickly absorb ~20 million barrels per day of crude, condensate, refined products and LNG that normally transit the strait.
- Roughly 20–21 million barrels per day normally pass Hormuz; available bypass pipelines (Saudi East–West, UAE Habshan–Fujairah, some Iran/Jask capacity and limited overland routes) can cover only a fraction of that volume—estimates put practical alternative pipeline capacity in the low millions of b/d, not tens of millions.
- Product mix and infrastructure limits: Hormuz carries crude, refined products, condensate and a large share of regional LNG; many pipelines are built for crude only and terminals/receivers (storage, loading berths, refineries, LNG regasification) lack the spare capacity to handle suddenly rerouted flows.
- Terminal and port constraints: Even if pipelines can move oil inland, export terminals (berths, storage tanks, tanker availability, insurance and security in alternative ports) limit how much can actually reach world markets.
- Speed and flexibility: Building new pipelines, expanding terminals or converting infrastructure takes months to years and huge capital; emergency measures (reserve releases, rerouting) provide only temporary, partial relief.
- LNG is especially hard to replace: LNG supply chains (liquefaction capacity, specialized tankers, regas terminals) are tight and cannot be swapped for pipeline crude flows; disruption of Gulf LNG exports would cause acute shortages.
- Secondary risks and costs: Rerouting often exposes shipments to other chokepoints (Suez, Bab el‑Mandeb), higher insurance and shipping costs, and security risks that further reduce effective throughput.
Add to that the fact that the closure of the Hormuz Strait significantly disrupts several critical supplies beyond oil and gas.
These include:
Fertilizers
- Approximately one-third of the world's fertilizers pass through the Hormuz Strait.
- Fertilizers such as urea, potash, ammonia, and phosphates are essential for global agricultural production.
- The disruption is particularly concerning during the northern hemisphere's planting season, potentially impacting food yields later in the year.
Food Products
- The closure is expected to lead to increased food prices globally, with estimates suggesting a rise of 4.2% for wheat and 5.2% for fruits and vegetables.
- Countries most affected include Zambia (31%), Sri Lanka (15%), Taiwan (12%), and Pakistan (11%).
Medicines
- The supply of medicines is threatened due to the reliance on petrochemical derivatives, which are produced from oil and gas.
- Disruptions in the supply chain could lead to shortages and increased prices for essential medical products.
Helium
- The Hormuz Strait is a key transit point for helium, with about one-third of global shipments coming from Qatar.
- Helium is crucial for various applications, including MRI machines and semiconductor manufacturing.
- The closure has already led to production halts and could result in prolonged shortages, affecting healthcare and technology sectors.