I read your selected book review. It contains nothing supporting your premise. Wolfgang Strauss's claims that the Soviets would attack in July 1941 are not supportable when you look at the condition of Red Army units in the Western military districts in late June when the Germans attacked. The average rifle division was at between 40 and 50% strength (averaging 6,000 men out of a establishment strength of 14, 483). The NKO had authorized 99 rifle divisions in these districts to be brought up to full strength in April 1941, but only 21 had reached 70 to 82% of the full table of equipment and manpower.
As an example of this, the 45th Rifle Division on 22 June 41 had 8373 men (out of 14,483 authorized), 78 artillery pieces out of 132 authorized, and none of the 66 mortars, 12 antiaircraft guns, or 16 light tanks it was supposed to have. It had 127 out of 558 motor vehicles authorized. This is typical across the board for the Red Army in June 1941. There is no way that such an ill-equipped military was going to suddenly be prepared to undertake a major offensive less than 30 days later.
As for Seelöwe (the codename for the invasion of England), the Germans might have tried to invade England, but it would have been an unmitigated disaster for them. They lacked a navy to cover their landing forces and those forces were supposed to make the invasion in a pathetic bunch of improvised landing craft and other flotsam. The initial wave of landing troops was to be in aggregate, a bit more than three infantry divisions in strength. That landing wave was to take between 3 and 7 days to fully get ashore. There was no solid plan for a second wave to follow.