The Women of Iran

Share your ' proof ' , dumbass- and NO, I'm don't going to remove you from my threadban list


Haw, haw............................haw.



You see, that's the pleasure of a forum such as this. Potty-mouthed mental cripples never get to run it.
Be satisfied with your lowly position of spite-ejaculating addlepate.

Haw, haw................................haw.

Somebody told me that you're a broad, moon.
Is that true?
Are you some hejab wearing schifosa?

I had taken you for a guy, which would be even worse.
If you're just a dumb fucking middle eastern broad, you probably never really had a chance to make anything of yourself in a misogynist environment.
 
Somebody told me that you're a broad, moon.
Is that true?
Are you some hejab wearing schifosa?

I had taken you for a guy, which would be even worse.
If you're just a dumb fucking middle eastern broad, you probably never really had a chance to make anything of yourself in a misogynist environment.

Be satisfied with your lowly position of spite-ejaculating addlepate.

Haw, haw................................haw.
 
Well for a start Iranians are not Arabs, if you were as wise and clued up as you pretend to be then you'd know that.

The Brits and the US considered Mossadegh to be a truly ungrateful bastard, Iran was saved from Nazi occupation and then the Soviets in turn. You need to do some reading up about that and stop spouting bullshit if that's possible.

Iran: The Truth about the CIA and the Shah

The common wisdom is wrong; a history lesson is in order. A cousin of mine has finished his freshman year in college; like most freshmen, he now knows absolutely everything. He took it upon himself, this week, to announce (to my brother, who is a very patient man) that Iran’s Islamist dictators were “a predictable consequence of American imperialism,” which manifested itself through “the CIA’s international pro-fascist crimes.”

That’s nonsense, of course, but it’s widely believed nonsense — and not just among college kids who’ve read the first chapter of a Noam Chomsky book. There are serious men who are under the impression that the CIA led a coup to replace an upstanding, democratic reformer named Mohammed Mossadegh with a fascist Shah named Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and that Pahlavi’s crimes were so atrocious that Iran was driven into the arms of the mullahs. None of that is true. And with Congress getting ready to vote on the Iran deal, everyone could use a little historical perspective.

Mossadegh, a popular parliamentarian, was appointed prime minister by the Shah in the spring of 1951. He quickly set about social-reforming: Serfs were freed, paid sick-leave was mandated, landlords’ revenues were tithed to pay for public works — and the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was nationalized.

The story of Iranian oil dates back to 1901, when an English businessman named William D’Arcy negotiated an oil-exploration contract with the (then) Shah of Iran, Shah Qajar. In exchange for a large cash payment and shares in the ensuing oil company, along with 16 percent of all oil revenue, D’Arcy acquired exclusive drilling rights in most of Iran for 60 years.

At first, it seemed that Iran had gotten the (much) better end of the deal: After seven years of prospecting, D’Arcy had found nothing. He was almost bankrupt; he had recapitalized with a new partner, the Burmah [sic] Oil Company, which wanted to call it a day. D’Arcy was already in the process of closing up his Iranian shop when — lo and behold — he struck oil, in May 1908.

The British government, hoping to reduce its dependence on coal, invested heavily in in the D’Arcy–Burmah company, which was renamed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and later the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The AIOC turned a large profit for the British, and, with 16 percent of the revenue, Iran turned a large profit too. As time went on, though, Iran’s government came to consider the initial 1901 arrangement unfair; after lengthy negotiations, in 1933 — 32 years into a 60-year deal — the British agreed to sign a new contract. In the late Forties, Iran’s government again demanded a new contract, which led to a “supplemental” agreement in 1949, setting higher minimum payments to Iran. Nonetheless, in 1951, Mossadegh had all Anglo-Iranian Oil agreements terminated and the AIOC nationalized. He described the nationalization as a blow against British imperialism.

Extremely valuable property, legally owned by the British government and British private citizens, had been confiscated by a foreign government. Before the war, Britain might have invaded. Instead, it retaliated against Mossadegh by leading an international embargo of Iran’s oil and by withdrawing its technicians from the nationalized holdings. Without British know-how, the company could barely function; after the withdrawal, Iranian oil production dropped 96 percent. And the oil that was produced couldn’t be sold.

Oil money funded the Iranian government; without it, Mossadegh’s reforms were worthless, and his popularity plunged. Mossadegh called a parliamentary election in late 1951. When he realized he was going to lose, he had the election suspended.

(That should put to bed the notion that he was an idealistic democrat.)

Nonetheless, Shah Pahlavi allowed Mossadegh to form a new government, and in the summer of ’52, Mossadegh demanded authority to appoint a new minister of war and a new chief of staff, which would give him control of Iran’s military — thitherto under the authority of (and loyal to) the Shah. The Shah refused; Mossadegh resigned, and began to organize anti-Shah demonstrations. Iran was thrown into chaos, and, fearing collapse of the country, the Shah acquiesced, re-appointed Mossadegh, and gave him full control over the military.

Reinstated, Mossadegh — in the tradition of all great democrats — persuaded the parliament to grant him emergency powers, which he used to confiscate the Shah’s land, ban him from communicating with foreign countries, and exile his sister. Mossadegh also used his emergency powers to institute collective farming. According to Stephen Kinzer’s book All the Shah’s Men, “Iranians were becoming poorer and unhappier by the day. Mossadegh’s political coalition was fraying.”

You may have noticed that, up to this point, the dark and shadowy hand of the CIA has not made an appearance. In fact, the U.S.’s only role in the proceedings thus far was as an intermediary between Iran and Britain in an effort to reach a settlement everyone could live with — something that turned out not to be possible. (The U.S. also played an accidental role in aggravating the situation when an American oil company reached a 50-50 oil-revenue agreement with the Saudis, which made Iran’s 16 percent deal look shabby by comparison.)

After American mediation failed, the U.S. took Iran’s side, accusing the British of being unreasonably immovable. That changed, however, in 1953: According to a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations named Ray Takeyh, as Iran’s economy collapsed, “Mossadeq responded . . . by behaving in an increasingly autocratic manner.” As Mossadegh’s policies drove Iran further and further into poverty, it looked more and more likely that he would turn to the Soviet Union for support. At least, that was the view of Dwight Eisenhower and Winston Churchill, two men who had more than their fair share of experience in the spread of Soviet socialism. It began to appear that the choice in Iran would be a Soviet-backed dictator — a Mao, a Kim, a Kun — or a pro-Western dictator who they hoped would steer the country toward democracy, as in South Korea or Taiwan.

https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/07/what-really-happened-shahs-iran/

Yep, Nutberg has disappeared for good!!
 
319632382_834094161202670_1403329442076667045_n.jpg


A historic moment: The UN Economic and Social Council voted to remove the Islamic Republic from its Commission on the Status of Women.


Of course, this will be meaningless to those who denounce UN democracy when it , far more overwhelmingly, condemns Israeli fascism.
Again, Zionism has filleted western morality and replaced it with hypocrisy as policy.
 
Well for a start Iranians are not Arabs, if you were as wise and clued up as you pretend to be then you'd know that.

The Brits and the US considered Mossadegh to be a truly ungrateful bastard, Iran was saved from Nazi occupation and then the Soviets in turn. You need to do some reading up about that and stop spouting bullshit if that's possible.

Iran: The Truth about the CIA and the Shah

The common wisdom is wrong; a history lesson is in order. A cousin of mine has finished his freshman year in college; like most freshmen, he now knows absolutely everything. He took it upon himself, this week, to announce (to my brother, who is a very patient man) that Iran’s Islamist dictators were “a predictable consequence of American imperialism,” which manifested itself through “the CIA’s international pro-fascist crimes.”

That’s nonsense, of course, but it’s widely believed nonsense — and not just among college kids who’ve read the first chapter of a Noam Chomsky book. There are serious men who are under the impression that the CIA led a coup to replace an upstanding, democratic reformer named Mohammed Mossadegh with a fascist Shah named Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and that Pahlavi’s crimes were so atrocious that Iran was driven into the arms of the mullahs. None of that is true. And with Congress getting ready to vote on the Iran deal, everyone could use a little historical perspective.

Mossadegh, a popular parliamentarian, was appointed prime minister by the Shah in the spring of 1951. He quickly set about social-reforming: Serfs were freed, paid sick-leave was mandated, landlords’ revenues were tithed to pay for public works — and the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was nationalized.

The story of Iranian oil dates back to 1901, when an English businessman named William D’Arcy negotiated an oil-exploration contract with the (then) Shah of Iran, Shah Qajar. In exchange for a large cash payment and shares in the ensuing oil company, along with 16 percent of all oil revenue, D’Arcy acquired exclusive drilling rights in most of Iran for 60 years.

At first, it seemed that Iran had gotten the (much) better end of the deal: After seven years of prospecting, D’Arcy had found nothing. He was almost bankrupt; he had recapitalized with a new partner, the Burmah [sic] Oil Company, which wanted to call it a day. D’Arcy was already in the process of closing up his Iranian shop when — lo and behold — he struck oil, in May 1908.

The British government, hoping to reduce its dependence on coal, invested heavily in in the D’Arcy–Burmah company, which was renamed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and later the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The AIOC turned a large profit for the British, and, with 16 percent of the revenue, Iran turned a large profit too. As time went on, though, Iran’s government came to consider the initial 1901 arrangement unfair; after lengthy negotiations, in 1933 — 32 years into a 60-year deal — the British agreed to sign a new contract. In the late Forties, Iran’s government again demanded a new contract, which led to a “supplemental” agreement in 1949, setting higher minimum payments to Iran. Nonetheless, in 1951, Mossadegh had all Anglo-Iranian Oil agreements terminated and the AIOC nationalized. He described the nationalization as a blow against British imperialism.

Extremely valuable property, legally owned by the British government and British private citizens, had been confiscated by a foreign government. Before the war, Britain might have invaded. Instead, it retaliated against Mossadegh by leading an international embargo of Iran’s oil and by withdrawing its technicians from the nationalized holdings. Without British know-how, the company could barely function; after the withdrawal, Iranian oil production dropped 96 percent. And the oil that was produced couldn’t be sold.

Oil money funded the Iranian government; without it, Mossadegh’s reforms were worthless, and his popularity plunged. Mossadegh called a parliamentary election in late 1951. When he realized he was going to lose, he had the election suspended.

(That should put to bed the notion that he was an idealistic democrat.)

Nonetheless, Shah Pahlavi allowed Mossadegh to form a new government, and in the summer of ’52, Mossadegh demanded authority to appoint a new minister of war and a new chief of staff, which would give him control of Iran’s military — thitherto under the authority of (and loyal to) the Shah. The Shah refused; Mossadegh resigned, and began to organize anti-Shah demonstrations. Iran was thrown into chaos, and, fearing collapse of the country, the Shah acquiesced, re-appointed Mossadegh, and gave him full control over the military.

Reinstated, Mossadegh — in the tradition of all great democrats — persuaded the parliament to grant him emergency powers, which he used to confiscate the Shah’s land, ban him from communicating with foreign countries, and exile his sister. Mossadegh also used his emergency powers to institute collective farming. According to Stephen Kinzer’s book All the Shah’s Men, “Iranians were becoming poorer and unhappier by the day. Mossadegh’s political coalition was fraying.”

You may have noticed that, up to this point, the dark and shadowy hand of the CIA has not made an appearance. In fact, the U.S.’s only role in the proceedings thus far was as an intermediary between Iran and Britain in an effort to reach a settlement everyone could live with — something that turned out not to be possible. (The U.S. also played an accidental role in aggravating the situation when an American oil company reached a 50-50 oil-revenue agreement with the Saudis, which made Iran’s 16 percent deal look shabby by comparison.)

After American mediation failed, the U.S. took Iran’s side, accusing the British of being unreasonably immovable. That changed, however, in 1953: According to a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations named Ray Takeyh, as Iran’s economy collapsed, “Mossadeq responded . . . by behaving in an increasingly autocratic manner.” As Mossadegh’s policies drove Iran further and further into poverty, it looked more and more likely that he would turn to the Soviet Union for support. At least, that was the view of Dwight Eisenhower and Winston Churchill, two men who had more than their fair share of experience in the spread of Soviet socialism. It began to appear that the choice in Iran would be a Soviet-backed dictator — a Mao, a Kim, a Kun — or a pro-Western dictator who they hoped would steer the country toward democracy, as in South Korea or Taiwan.

https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/07/what-really-happened-shahs-iran/

Hey Nutberg, where are you? You're infamous for just spouting bullshit and then running away, of course we all know why!!
 
Well for a start Iranians are not Arabs, if you were as wise and clued up as you pretend to be then you'd know that.

The Brits and the US considered Mossadegh to be a truly ungrateful bastard, Iran was saved from Nazi occupation and then the Soviets in turn. You need to do some reading up about that and stop spouting bullshit if that's possible.

Iran: The Truth about the CIA and the Shah

The common wisdom is wrong; a history lesson is in order. A cousin of mine has finished his freshman year in college; like most freshmen, he now knows absolutely everything. He took it upon himself, this week, to announce (to my brother, who is a very patient man) that Iran’s Islamist dictators were “a predictable consequence of American imperialism,” which manifested itself through “the CIA’s international pro-fascist crimes.”

That’s nonsense, of course, but it’s widely believed nonsense — and not just among college kids who’ve read the first chapter of a Noam Chomsky book. There are serious men who are under the impression that the CIA led a coup to replace an upstanding, democratic reformer named Mohammed Mossadegh with a fascist Shah named Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and that Pahlavi’s crimes were so atrocious that Iran was driven into the arms of the mullahs. None of that is true. And with Congress getting ready to vote on the Iran deal, everyone could use a little historical perspective.

Mossadegh, a popular parliamentarian, was appointed prime minister by the Shah in the spring of 1951. He quickly set about social-reforming: Serfs were freed, paid sick-leave was mandated, landlords’ revenues were tithed to pay for public works — and the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was nationalized.

The story of Iranian oil dates back to 1901, when an English businessman named William D’Arcy negotiated an oil-exploration contract with the (then) Shah of Iran, Shah Qajar. In exchange for a large cash payment and shares in the ensuing oil company, along with 16 percent of all oil revenue, D’Arcy acquired exclusive drilling rights in most of Iran for 60 years.

At first, it seemed that Iran had gotten the (much) better end of the deal: After seven years of prospecting, D’Arcy had found nothing. He was almost bankrupt; he had recapitalized with a new partner, the Burmah [sic] Oil Company, which wanted to call it a day. D’Arcy was already in the process of closing up his Iranian shop when — lo and behold — he struck oil, in May 1908.

The British government, hoping to reduce its dependence on coal, invested heavily in in the D’Arcy–Burmah company, which was renamed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and later the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The AIOC turned a large profit for the British, and, with 16 percent of the revenue, Iran turned a large profit too. As time went on, though, Iran’s government came to consider the initial 1901 arrangement unfair; after lengthy negotiations, in 1933 — 32 years into a 60-year deal — the British agreed to sign a new contract. In the late Forties, Iran’s government again demanded a new contract, which led to a “supplemental” agreement in 1949, setting higher minimum payments to Iran. Nonetheless, in 1951, Mossadegh had all Anglo-Iranian Oil agreements terminated and the AIOC nationalized. He described the nationalization as a blow against British imperialism.

Extremely valuable property, legally owned by the British government and British private citizens, had been confiscated by a foreign government. Before the war, Britain might have invaded. Instead, it retaliated against Mossadegh by leading an international embargo of Iran’s oil and by withdrawing its technicians from the nationalized holdings. Without British know-how, the company could barely function; after the withdrawal, Iranian oil production dropped 96 percent. And the oil that was produced couldn’t be sold.

Oil money funded the Iranian government; without it, Mossadegh’s reforms were worthless, and his popularity plunged. Mossadegh called a parliamentary election in late 1951. When he realized he was going to lose, he had the election suspended.

(That should put to bed the notion that he was an idealistic democrat.)

Nonetheless, Shah Pahlavi allowed Mossadegh to form a new government, and in the summer of ’52, Mossadegh demanded authority to appoint a new minister of war and a new chief of staff, which would give him control of Iran’s military — thitherto under the authority of (and loyal to) the Shah. The Shah refused; Mossadegh resigned, and began to organize anti-Shah demonstrations. Iran was thrown into chaos, and, fearing collapse of the country, the Shah acquiesced, re-appointed Mossadegh, and gave him full control over the military.

Reinstated, Mossadegh — in the tradition of all great democrats — persuaded the parliament to grant him emergency powers, which he used to confiscate the Shah’s land, ban him from communicating with foreign countries, and exile his sister. Mossadegh also used his emergency powers to institute collective farming. According to Stephen Kinzer’s book All the Shah’s Men, “Iranians were becoming poorer and unhappier by the day. Mossadegh’s political coalition was fraying.”

You may have noticed that, up to this point, the dark and shadowy hand of the CIA has not made an appearance. In fact, the U.S.’s only role in the proceedings thus far was as an intermediary between Iran and Britain in an effort to reach a settlement everyone could live with — something that turned out not to be possible. (The U.S. also played an accidental role in aggravating the situation when an American oil company reached a 50-50 oil-revenue agreement with the Saudis, which made Iran’s 16 percent deal look shabby by comparison.)

After American mediation failed, the U.S. took Iran’s side, accusing the British of being unreasonably immovable. That changed, however, in 1953: According to a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations named Ray Takeyh, as Iran’s economy collapsed, “Mossadeq responded . . . by behaving in an increasingly autocratic manner.” As Mossadegh’s policies drove Iran further and further into poverty, it looked more and more likely that he would turn to the Soviet Union for support. At least, that was the view of Dwight Eisenhower and Winston Churchill, two men who had more than their fair share of experience in the spread of Soviet socialism. It began to appear that the choice in Iran would be a Soviet-backed dictator — a Mao, a Kim, a Kun — or a pro-Western dictator who they hoped would steer the country toward democracy, as in South Korea or Taiwan.

https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/07/what-really-happened-shahs-iran/

Hey Nutberg, where are you? You're infamous for just spouting bullshit and then running away, of course we all know why!!
 
Nonetheless, in 1951, Mossadegh had all Anglo-Iranian Oil agreements terminated and the AIOC nationalized. He described the nationalization as a blow against British imperialism.

Extremely valuable property, legally owned by the British government and British private citizens, had been confiscated by a foreign government. Before the war, Britain might have invaded. Instead, it retaliated against Mossadegh by leading an international embargo of Iran’s oil and by withdrawing its technicians from the nationalized holdings. Without British know-how, the company could barely function; after the withdrawal, Iranian oil production dropped 96 percent. And the oil that was produced couldn’t be sold.

Oil money funded the Iranian government; without it, Mossadegh’s reforms were worthless, and his popularity plunged. Mossadegh called a parliamentary election in late 1951. When he realized he was going to lose, he had the election suspended.
 
The truth is that before Bush, Iran was very westernized. The women went to school, worked outside the home, drove, and wore clothes of their choosing. Religions take countries back in time. They harm education. Christianity is capable of doing the same.

*Carter
 
Quote Originally Posted by Nordberg
The truth is that before Bush, Iran was very westernized. The women went to school, worked outside the home, drove, and wore clothes of their choosing. Religions take countries back in time. They harm education. Christianity is capable of doing the same.

When you have no weapons and your aggressive and advancing enemy has many then religion becomes a powerful defense.
 
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