security assistance is more than just gifting equipment—
it is a complex question of creating or supporting capabilities and answering the right questions.
When it is done wrong, it can create new problems.
And in a powder keg like Ukraine, where the war could explode into a NATO-Russia conflict,
it is a question of supporting capabilities without causing a direct clash between nuclear powers.
the idea that NATO’s Eastern European members should donate MiG-29 Fulcrum aircraft to Ukraine,
as the airframe is operated by Ukrainian forces.
Recently, Poland offered to fly its aging MiGs to Ramstein Air Base in Germany, where U.S. forces would facilitate their transfer to Ukrainian pilots, who would fly the aircraft back to Ukraine.
Some have descended further down this rabbit hole by suggesting the United States deliver its own A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft to Ukraine—prompted in part by a long Russian jam of vehicles that has now mostly cleared.
Successful security assistance begins with an identified requirement:
What is the battlefield result Ukraine needs to achieve?
Are Ukrainian forces unable to intercept Russian aircraft, or are they searching for ways to increase their assaults on Russia’s creaking logistics convoys and bogged-down tanks?
Would more planes make a difference in either respect?
These questions are absent from public conversation, but U.S. defense officials state repeatedly that the move would be more risk than reward.
Most of Ukraine’s fighter aircraft are still in the fight, with Ukraine’s Air Force flying approximately five to 10 missions per day using a pool of about 50 jets. By contrast, Russian aircraft are flying nearly 200 missions per day but keeping their planes primarily within Russian airspace. Both sides are likely exercising extreme caution to avoid ground-based air defense systems. Given this knowledge, a score of Soviet-era air superiority assets would not meaningfully improve Ukraine’s military situation.
Publicly available information does not seem to indicate Ukraine is short of air superiority—open source intelligence site Oryx lists confirmation of seven fighters destroyed since the start of the Russian invasion—or that air superiority fighters are a key element of Ukraine’s defense plan....
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/14/ukraine-poland-jets-fighters/
it is a complex question of creating or supporting capabilities and answering the right questions.
When it is done wrong, it can create new problems.
And in a powder keg like Ukraine, where the war could explode into a NATO-Russia conflict,
it is a question of supporting capabilities without causing a direct clash between nuclear powers.
the idea that NATO’s Eastern European members should donate MiG-29 Fulcrum aircraft to Ukraine,
as the airframe is operated by Ukrainian forces.
Recently, Poland offered to fly its aging MiGs to Ramstein Air Base in Germany, where U.S. forces would facilitate their transfer to Ukrainian pilots, who would fly the aircraft back to Ukraine.
Some have descended further down this rabbit hole by suggesting the United States deliver its own A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft to Ukraine—prompted in part by a long Russian jam of vehicles that has now mostly cleared.
Successful security assistance begins with an identified requirement:
What is the battlefield result Ukraine needs to achieve?
Are Ukrainian forces unable to intercept Russian aircraft, or are they searching for ways to increase their assaults on Russia’s creaking logistics convoys and bogged-down tanks?
Would more planes make a difference in either respect?
These questions are absent from public conversation, but U.S. defense officials state repeatedly that the move would be more risk than reward.
Most of Ukraine’s fighter aircraft are still in the fight, with Ukraine’s Air Force flying approximately five to 10 missions per day using a pool of about 50 jets. By contrast, Russian aircraft are flying nearly 200 missions per day but keeping their planes primarily within Russian airspace. Both sides are likely exercising extreme caution to avoid ground-based air defense systems. Given this knowledge, a score of Soviet-era air superiority assets would not meaningfully improve Ukraine’s military situation.
Publicly available information does not seem to indicate Ukraine is short of air superiority—open source intelligence site Oryx lists confirmation of seven fighters destroyed since the start of the Russian invasion—or that air superiority fighters are a key element of Ukraine’s defense plan....
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/14/ukraine-poland-jets-fighters/
Legion has lost the debate, but at least he still has a sense of humor.