Russia emerges as world’s No. 2 arms producer

dukkha

Verified User
https://dmlnews.com/report-russia-emerges-worlds-no-2-arms-producer/
Below is a report that DML News gives a 4 OUT OF 4 STARS trustworthiness rating. We base this rating on the following criteria:

Provides named sources
Reported by more than one notable outlet
Does not insert opinion or leading words
Includes supporting video, direct statements, or photos

Click here to read more about our rating system.

As the most reliable and balanced news aggregation service on the internet, DML News offers the following information published by APNEWS.COM:

HELSINKI (AP) — A Swedish think tank said Monday that Russia has emerged as the world’s second-largest arms producer after the United States. Russia surpassed Britain, which had held that spot since 2002 and remains Western Europe’s No. 1 arms maker.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute said in its annual report on the world’s 100 biggest armaments groups that the combined arms sales of Russian companies amounted to $37.7 billion in 2017, an 8.5 percent rise from a year earlier. Russia’s sales accounted for 9.5 percent of a worldwide total of $398.2 billion.

The report includes both domestic and foreign sales around the globe, but doesn’t include Chinese companies because of unreliable statistics, the institute said.

Siemon Wezeman, a senior researcher at the institute, said Russian producers of arms and weapon systems have been on a significant growth path since 2011.

“This is in line with Russia’s increased spending on arms procurement to modernize its armed forces,” Wezeman said.

For the first time in the report’s history, a Russian company — the Moscow-based and state-owned Almaz-Antey that makes advanced air defense systems among other things — was listed among the world’s top 10 weapons companies.

The report noted Russia started an initiative to consolidate its arms industry in 2007, a process that is expected to be completed soon.

Overall, the U.S. continued to dominate the list with 42 companies accounting for 57 percent of total sales, including the world’s largest arms producer, Lockheed Martin Corp.
 
Russian engineering coupled with Chinese wealth and forces. The military threat is not Russia or China -it's those combined.
Here is video of staging at Vostok 2018 /combined integrated Russian and Chinese war games.

The West needs to watch Russia and China's military partnership
https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/14/asia/vostok-2018-analysis-ilyushina-hodge-intl/index.html
Military analysts around the world are keeping a close eye on Russia’s annual fall military maneuvers, as this year may turn out to be the largest post-Cold War show of force. Vostok-2018 kicks off this week in Russia’s Far East and the Pacific Ocean, along with auxiliary exercises before and after the main event.

The big news this year is the addition of joint exercises with China. What do these military exercises entail, and what do you need to know?'''''
 
Last edited:
According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense, the goal of Chinese participation is to further Russian-Chinese relations and strengthen the strategic partnership between the two states.
The exercise will also provide the Chinese military, which has not been involved in combat operations in several decades, an opportunity to learn combat tactics and strategy from recent Russian experiences fighting in Syria.

5. What is the political impact?

Russia no doubt welcomes this signal of Chinese support at a time when political tensions with NATO and the United States show no sign of abating
Chinese participation in Russia’s major annual military exercise is a signal that Beijing is ready to develop a closer partnership with Moscow if relations with the United States continue to deteriorate.

Chinese official media have been uncharacteristically ebullient about the political meaning of this exercise, trumpeting a deepening strategic partnership — for the first time openly highlighting that China’s partnership with Russia is intended to challenge the hegemonic role of the United States in the international system.


At the same time, one exercise, even a large and politically significant one such as Vostok-2018, stops short of any covert declaration of a bilateral military alliance.
Nor is Vostok-2018 a rehearsal for a large-scale global war. As was the case last year with the Zapad exercise, when many analysts overstated that size of the exercise and discussed the likelihood it would serve as cover for a Russian occupation of Belarus and/or a new invasion of Ukraine.

threat inflation serves only to discredit the analysts and foster media fatigue about the real threats posed by the Russian military and its gradually developing partnership with China.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...ercises/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1c49823c4a49
 
According to the Chinese Ministry of Defense, the goal of Chinese participation is to further Russian-Chinese relations and strengthen the strategic partnership between the two states.
The exercise will also provide the Chinese military, which has not been involved in combat operations in several decades, an opportunity to learn combat tactics and strategy from recent Russian experiences fighting in Syria.

5. What is the political impact?

Russia no doubt welcomes this signal of Chinese support at a time when political tensions with NATO and the United States show no sign of abating
Chinese participation in Russia’s major annual military exercise is a signal that Beijing is ready to develop a closer partnership with Moscow if relations with the United States continue to deteriorate.

Chinese official media have been uncharacteristically ebullient about the political meaning of this exercise, trumpeting a deepening strategic partnership — for the first time openly highlighting that China’s partnership with Russia is intended to challenge the hegemonic role of the United States in the international system.


At the same time, one exercise, even a large and politically significant one such as Vostok-2018, stops short of any covert declaration of a bilateral military alliance.
Nor is Vostok-2018 a rehearsal for a large-scale global war. As was the case last year with the Zapad exercise, when many analysts overstated that size of the exercise and discussed the likelihood it would serve as cover for a Russian occupation of Belarus and/or a new invasion of Ukraine.

threat inflation serves only to discredit the analysts and foster media fatigue about the real threats posed by the Russian military and its gradually developing partnership with China.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...ercises/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1c49823c4a49

I will bet you think we should be building, and selling, more weapons around the world, right? More guns, more peace, right?

Tell me something you stupid fuck, what do you think would happen if every gang in America had more guns?

Now see if your wee little midget of a brain could figure out what would happen if every petty dictator, every terrorist group like ISIS, or Boca Raton, or even the drug cartels, had more weapons?

More peace?

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ussr-and-prc-sign-mutual-defense-treaty


THIS DAY IN HISTORY

1950

USSR and PRC sign mutual defense treaty

The Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, the two largest communist nations in the world, announce the signing of a mutual defense and assistance treaty.

The negotiations for the treaty were conducted in Moscow between PRC leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky. The treaty’s terms called for the Soviets to provide a $300 million credit to the PRC. It also mandated that the Soviet Union return to the Chinese the control of a major railroad and the cities of Port Arthur and Dairen in Manchuria, all of which had been seized by Russian forces near the end of World War II. The mutual defense section of the agreement primarily concerned any future aggression by Japan and “any other state directly or indirectly associated” with Japan. Zhou En-lai proudly declared that the linking of the two communist nations created a force that was “impossible to defeat.”

Then you have this:

https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/17/world/russia-and-china-sign-friendship-pact.html

That was under Bush, and now under Trump we get this:

https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/china-and-russia-sign-military-cooperation-roadmap/
 
Last edited:
I will bet you think we should be building, and selling, more weapons around the world, right? More guns, more peace, right?

Tell me something you stupid fuck, what do you think would happen if every gang in America had more guns?

Now see if your wee little midget of a brain could figure out what would happen if every petty dictator, every terrorist group like ISIS, or Boca Raton, or even the drug cartels, had more weapons?

More peace?
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/ussr-and-prc-sign-mutual-defense-treaty
THIS DAY IN HISTORY
1950
USSR and PRC sign mutual defense treaty
The Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, the two largest communist nations in the world, announce the signing of a mutual defense and assistance treaty.

https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/17/world/russia-and-china-sign-friendship-pact.html

That was under Bush, and now under Trump we get this:

https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/china-and-russia-sign-military-cooperation-roadmap/
Nixon broke the Sino-USSR relationship with the trip to the PRC. The so called "ping-pong diplomacy".

It "opened up China" from it's severe xenophobia to becoming the modern day state.
But ever since Nixon played the "China card" the US has been effective in keeping an all out military allianace between Russia and China.
~~

the Friendship Pact you show was more about normalizing existing Asian relations between the 2
```
Putin and President Jiang Zemin of China went to some length to explain that the accord, the first such agreement signed since the era of Stalin and Mao, was between neighbors that are seeking a new stability for Asian growth and development while carrying no content related to military alliance.
Continue reading the main story

In a joint statement, the two nations said that they were hoping for a ''just and rational new international order'' and that the merger of their interests enshrined today were ''not directed against third countries.''

https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/17/world/russia-and-china-sign-friendship-pact.html
~~

Consider those against a tight integrated Russian-Sino armed forces, That's where this is headed.
Which is why sanctions are stupid and counterproductive ; they drive Xi and Putin closer and closer.

That applies to economic partnership as well, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation
 
Speaking in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, Mr. Putin said further expansion to Russia's borders would prolong the divisions of the cold war.
''The problem should be simple,'' he said. ''In the West, everyone says, 'We don't want new divisions in Europe, we don't want new Berlin Walls.' Good. We completely agree.''

''But when NATO enlarges, division doesn't disappear, it simply moves toward our borders,''
he said, complaining that NATO actions in Europe were free to pursue the political objectives of the Western alliance, even when there was no agreement in the United Nations Security Council for action.
 
Did the Chinese theft of data on the US fighter jet and other weapons shrink the Pentagon's technical superiority?

New technical specs about China’s new J-31 fighter, a plane designed to rival the American-made F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, popped up on a Chinese blog last week. So who has the advantage — the U.S. or China?

China’s twin-engine design bears a striking resemblance to the single-jet F-35. Still, the Joint Strike Fighter is expected to fly slightly farther and carry a heavier load of weapons, according to the data, which was first reported by Jane’s.

Military experts say that while the J-31 looks like, and may even fly like, the F-35, it’s what’s under the hood and embedded in the skin that really matters.
The U.S. has the better computer software, unique sensors and other hardware, stealth coating, and engines technology—all critical attributes that make fifth-generation aircraft different than the military jets of last century.

j-31-vs-f-35_.png


the F-35, unlike previous aircraft, has been designed to receive upgrades over the years, which will ultimately improve its capabilities, allowing it defeat new threats.

F-35 development will end in October 2017. After that the program will move into a “follow-on development” phase, said F-35 project spokesman Joe DellaVedova. “One of the F-35’s great strengths is that it’s a growth platform, so its software, its processors, its radar, its capability; there’s a lot of room for growth.”

The jet fighters will get software and hardware upgrades every two years on an alternating basis.
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/...s-f-35-after-new-specs-chinas-copycat/121859/
 
F-35 combat testing begins. The extensive tests are getting off the ground some 15 months behind schedule, thanks to “an extension in flight testing, software glitches and delays, and quality issues,” Bloomberg reports. The aircraft must pass them before the Pentagon can buy “of a planned 2,456 aircraft.

More than 320 F-35s are already operating from 15 bases worldwide as Pentagon and Lockheed continue to wrestle with resolving more than 900 deficiencies, including flaws in the plane’s complex software.” Read on, here.

Speaking of F-35 software: Defense One’s Patrick Tucker reports that a California-based AI company, C3, is developing at least two products for the F-35 program.

One will help predict when a given aircraft will need maintenance, by combining and analyzing data collected by the aircraft’s existing ALIS diagnostics system and other sources;
Another will try to speed up the compilation of Mission Data Files that “can take up to 18 months to compile, bringing in info on everything from enemy radar and anti-aircraft missiles to waveforms and cyber weapons.” Read that, here.
https://www.defenseone.com/news/2018/12/the-d-brief-december-07-2018/153358/?oref=d-river
 
s Russia a U.S. 'Adversary' or Just a 'Competitor'?

Writing in the wake of the Kerch crisis, Jill Dougherty, summing up the latest discussions of the Mayflower Group, concluded: “America's current strategy toward Russia, simply put, is not working; it is instead tying our hands. It’s making Russia more aggressive externally and less democratic internally.”

In theory, U.S. policy vis-à-vis Russia should be grounded in the twin requirements of deterring and/or reversing Russian actions which we object to or which threaten our interests (or those of our allies) while simultaneously engaging to find areas of mutual concern where a cooperative approach produces positive outcomes for both parties.
Almost no one would object to this formulation—but the problem remains that operationalizing it has proven to be very difficult for the United States. This derives, in part, from continued adherence to the view that the world order as it existed in the 1990s—the so-called “unipolar” moment—is, in fact, the norm rather than an aberration. In that period, no other power or group of powers could prevent the United States from directing the international agenda; either they were largely in agreement with it or they lacked the wherewithal to impose serious costs on Washington. Generally, the principal limitations on the United States were largely self-imposed, in terms of the burdens the U.S. public, anxious for a peace dividend after the Cold War, was willing to bear.

The world as we move into the middle decades of the twenty-first century is starting to look more “normal” in terms of the overall patterns of human history. The United States remains the globe's predominant military and economic power, to be sure, with additional vast reserves of soft and “sticky” power that helps incentivize other countries to align themselves with U.S. preferences. But other countries have resurged or obtained greater wherewithal to push back on U.S. agenda-setting or to insist on agendas of their own. The United States policy establishment, however, lacks experience and, daresay, comfort, with dealing with rivals.

In particular, Washington must come to grips with the distinction between a “competitor” and an “adversary.” A competitor seeks advantage, but usually will agree to shared rules of engagement, and does not necessarily see competition as zero-sum or even hostile. We have a tendency, however, to lump competitors as being no different that adversaries, or to assume that the very act of competing with us (in trade, technology or for advantage) must be interpreted as a sign of hostility. This has, in recent years, created new tensions with long-standing security partners in both Europe and Asia.

Getting this distinction right with Russia also matters. Russia has moved from a 1990s position of seeking inclusion with the West into a position of a competitor. Is that competition—for geopolitical influence and geo-economic advantage—manageable within an overall cooperative framework? If it is not, there are implications for U.S. policy—which would require the United States to decide how much of its time, resources and attention should be spent on meeting a Russia challenge (and what other challenges can be spared U.S. attention). It also returns us to the question of whether the primary driver of U.S. strategy in Eurasia for decades—to prevent a rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing that incentivizes Russia and China to cooperate more with each other against the United States—should remain operative.

Dealing with Russia as a serious competitor—even given its economic size and population endowment—also requires facing up to the challenge of how to compete. A serious competitor has at its disposal the ability both to accept punishment within acceptable losses (which appears to be the tally sheet for the effectiveness of current Western sanctions on Russia) as well as to raise costs (as Russia has done in the Middle East). Russia is able to do this because it possesses, for the near and medium term, sufficient reserves of power that cannot be wished away or for which a strategy of predicting negative trends for Russia after 2050 is not feasible. In meeting that competition, the U.S. political establishment must tackle whether the goal is to try and deter (or compel) Russia to change course, or to push for the removal of Russia as a major power by moving beyond deterrence and compellence to provoke or accelerate factors that would lead to a decline in Russian power. The former strategy is consistent with dealing with a competitor; the latter for an adversary. It also goes without saying, however, that the latter approach is much costlier and riskier, especially when dealing with a nuclear-armed power.

We identify Russia as a “near-peer competitor” based particularly on the reality that Russia is one of the few countries which can credibly project power beyond its immediate border, especially military power. Russia's near-peer status is based on its population, military-industrial complex and resource endowments, which guarantee that even if Russia faces long-term problems, it will remain a major international actor for the next several U.S. presidential administrations. In dealing with near-peer competitors, there are two strategic choices. One is to turn a near-peer competitor into a near-peer partner; the other is to turn a near-peer competitor (and potential adversary) into a non-peer competitor. Again, these are two very different strategic choices which would utilize very different policy tools and, as the Mayflower Group has noted, would carry different sets of costs and consequences.

I steal Jill's point as my own conclusion:

“We need to re-think how we deal with Russia. Confrontation combined with an endless cycle of sanctions isn't the answer, even if sanctions sometimes are justified. But a “Let's just be friends” approach won't do either. For our own security, we need a bi-partisan, sustainable policy based on a realistic definition of why we even care about Russia.”

That means tackling not only what we don't like about Russian behavior, but what we are prepared to do, and pay for.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev, a contributing editor at the National Interest, is a professor of national-security studies at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are entirely his own.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/russia-u-apos-adversary-apos-023300037.html
 
I know. We should have zero competition.
Russian engineering is every bit as good as NATO -superior in missile design.
Why the S-300/400 is sought by various states. It's the best around.

In Egypt's case at least it became a buyer from Moscow when Obama put sanctions on weapons sales to Egypt
 
Back
Top