STANISLAV KRAPIVNIK
@STANISKRAPIVNIK
Answering the question of whether our fleet can prevent the capture of tankers, the following should be noted:1. Out of the 44-50 new-project corvettes/frigates that were supposed to be built before 2020 according to the initial plans of the early 2000s, the Russian Navy has received only 16, of which 10 are corvettes, whose ability to conduct active operations in the North Atlantic in winter conditions is itself questionable. Of the remaining six, two are currently locked in the Black Sea.2. Out of approximately 20 BOPs, destroyers, and cruisers of Soviet construction that were supposed to be modernized, only two updated units are currently in service. These are the RKR "Marshal Ustinov", which has undergone limited modernization, and the BOP/frigate "Marshal Shaposhnikov", which has undergone more extensive modernization.In these circumstances, taking into account the still combat-capable unmodernized ships of the 1st and 2nd ranks of Soviet construction, as well as units of the 3rd and 4th ranks, we have enough forces to maintain navigation in the Baltic and North Sea, but a constant presence four thousand miles away from our bases becomes an insurmountable problem. If the aforementioned plans had been implemented even halfway, it would certainly have been easier.3. If the problem of physical presence is solved (and there is also the issue of their freedom of action), and an effective escort system is established, there remains a significant vulnerability in the legal field. The US can declare the crews participating in such convoys of merchant ships wanted, as finding this information is not difficult, after which they will face the real prospect of wearing the orange jumpsuit of an American prisoner, while we will not be able to provide any support to third-country citizens working for fourth-country shipowners and sailing under fifth-country flags. Transferring everyone to our registry and keeping the crews secret is also impossible - the ship's role will have to be presented at the first port of call.It's worth noting the article by Admiral A.A. Moiseev, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, published in the 12th issue of "Military Thought" for 2025, "Ensuring the Safety of Civil Navigation by the Navy in the Face of Increasing Military Threats to the Russian Federation". In terms of ensuring navigation in the world ocean outside Russia's coastal waters and EEZs, the recommendations essentially boil down to curtailing navigation based on predicted changes in the situation, responding to these changes, including possible detentions of ships in foreign ports, and ensuring the rapid sheltering of ships in the ports of friendly and neutral countries. Interestingly, the issue of countering a possible naval blockade in remote ocean areas is not addressed at all for understandable reasons. In general, the only guaranteed routes today are the NSR and (for now) the Pacific Ocean near our shores.In general, there are no easy or quick solutions here.