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Investigations detail military’s decade-long ‘misperception’ of Hamas, its refusal to recognize the imminent invasion even in the last few hours, and the chaos that catastrophically slowed the fightback on the day
Some 5,000 Hamas-led terrorists from the Gaza Strip burst into southern Israel on October 7, 2023, carrying out a murderous rampage of unprecedented intensity and breadth. The IDF struggled to mount a response, its own probes now specify, with bases closest to the border overrun and the chain of command broken amid the chaos.
The attack claimed the lives of some 1,200 people in Israel, with another 251 people kidnapped and much of the area devastated. Most victims were civilians.
The material released by the IDF underlines the colossal failure for years ahead of Hamas’s invasion, in the final hours before it, and in the course of the terror group’s slaughter and abductions. It was only recognized months after the invasion and slaughter that the military’s Gaza Division, the regional unit responsible for the Strip and for protecting southern Israel, was “defeated” for several hours. The chaos and confusion catastrophically slowed the fightback on the day.
The IDF details intelligence material that was insistently misinterpreted over the years; the military’s overreliance on having an early warning to prepare its defenses; the degree to which troops were massively outnumbered by the invading terrorists; and the failure to understand what Hamas was doing during the attack.
Some 5,000 Hamas-led terrorists from the Gaza Strip burst into southern Israel on October 7, 2023, carrying out a murderous rampage of unprecedented intensity and breadth. The IDF struggled to mount a response, its own probes now specify, with bases closest to the border overrun and the chain of command broken amid the chaos.
The attack claimed the lives of some 1,200 people in Israel, with another 251 people kidnapped and much of the area devastated. Most victims were civilians.
The material released by the IDF underlines the colossal failure for years ahead of Hamas’s invasion, in the final hours before it, and in the course of the terror group’s slaughter and abductions. It was only recognized months after the invasion and slaughter that the military’s Gaza Division, the regional unit responsible for the Strip and for protecting southern Israel, was “defeated” for several hours. The chaos and confusion catastrophically slowed the fightback on the day.
The IDF details intelligence material that was insistently misinterpreted over the years; the military’s overreliance on having an early warning to prepare its defenses; the degree to which troops were massively outnumbered by the invading terrorists; and the failure to understand what Hamas was doing during the attack.
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