Egypt arrests three Islamic militants after gun attack on ship in Suez Canal

[anatta]

Egypt has arrested three people who opened fire with machine guns on a ship passing through the Suez Canal, an army source said on Sunday, playing down what the waterway's chief described as a terrorist attack.

During Saturday's unsuccessful attack, the Panamanian-registered container ship COSCO ASIA came under fire in a northern section of the canal, a major global trade artery which is secured by the Egyptian armed forces.

"There was an attempt to disrupt security in an area called el-Qantara as they fired at a ship in an attempt to halt (traffic on) the waterway," said the army source.

"Three were arrested and they have been dealt with ... This attack could not have harmed the ships," the source said, without giving any details except that an investigation was underway.

On Saturday, the head of the Suez Canal, Mohab Memish, said a terrorist had carried out the operation, suggesting Islamist militants could have been behind it. Suez Canal Authority sources said a rocket-propelled grenade had been used in the attack.

The sources said that even if a grenade had struck the ship, it would have had a limited impact. The aim, they said, was to create a media frenzy and hurt Egypt's image.

Asked if the military suspected the attack was part of a broader campaign to disrupt the movement of ships, the army source said. "I don't think so because the Suez Canal is secured."

Any major attack on the Suez Canal would hammer Egypt's economy, which depends heavily on revenue from the 192-km (120 mile) waterway, the quickest sea route between Asia and Europe.

Egypt has faced a rising number of militant attacks on security forces in the nearby lawless North Sinai region after the army, prompted by mass protests, ousted the country's first elected Islamist President, Mohamed Mursi, on July 3.

Growing insecurity in Sinai worries the United States because the area lies next to Israel and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip, as well as the Canal
http://news.yahoo.com/egypt-arrests-three-gun-attack-ship-suez-canal-112948691.html

 

[anatta]

more leftover goodies from the Morsi presidency. He was knowingly allowing "terrorists" to operate from the Sinai.

Egyptian authorities have also bee disgorging them from mosques.

Recall the EMB was going to "re-evaluate" the Egyptian -Sinai accords.

With Morsi Gone, Egypt Is Reportedly Cracking Down on Terrorism in Sinai and Sealing those Gaza Tunnels
http://news.yahoo.com/morsi-gone-egypt-reportedly-cracking-down-terrorism-sinai-171527630.html

With Morsi Gone, Egypt Is Cracking Down on Terrorism in Sinai and ... mosques as terrorist organizations, a designation that allows police to ..(more),

 

[anatta]

Sinai’s Role in Morsi’s Ouster
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/08/20/sinai-s-role-in-morsi-s-ouster/gjdw

While Morsi made many mistakes that provoked a disillusioned and increasingly impoverished population to challenge his legitimacy, the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Sinai may have been the main impetus for his ouster.
His refusal to employ heavy-handed tactics to stop the increasing flow of arms and militants into Sinai—and his seeming disinterest in avenging the deaths of Egyptian soldiers—led the Egyptian military to join the ranks of his detractors.
With the tacit support of their wary Israeli and American military counterparts, the Egyptian armed forces took matters into their own hands to protect what they deemed was Egypt’s top national security priority.

Preserving security in the Sinai Peninsula, particularly the eastern border with Israel, is an integral component of Egypt’s treaty obligations.
As a result, Egyptian security forces during the Mubarak era employed a zero tolerance approach against anyone they suspected of terrorism, including indigenous Bedouin historically abused by the state and lacking recourse to the judiciary.
Although the state’s heavy-handed tactics are intended for alleged militants who seek to support violent attacks against Israel from Gaza, Egypt’s Bedouin often faced the brunt of these tactics.
The state’s neglect of the region through inadequate allocation of state resources towards the most basic services has forced some Bedouin tribes to resort to serving as escorts in the smuggling industry as a means of economic survival.
As a consequence, Bedouin were presumed to be criminals and traffickers, resulting in collective punishment through arbitrary arrest and detention, followed by military trials pursuant to the three-decade-long emergency law.

Shortly after the 2011 revolution, an influx of anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles from Libya into Sinai began worsening the situation; this continued throughout Morsi’s presidency.
Some arms found their way into Gaza via underground tunnels, while others stayed in Sinai under the control of extremist groups who viewed the Morsi regime’s Islamic interpretations as too lax.
Along with arms came militants from abroad with various political objectives ranging from staging attacks on Israel to attacking Egyptian armed forces as part of their efforts to establish an Islamic emirate in Sinai.

Morsi’s response brought to the forefront his shift in foreign policy and national security—a shift that left the United States and its key regional ally, Israel, apprehensive about their geopolitical interests in the region.
As the Morsi regime’s relations with Hamas strengthened, smuggling of goods and weapons from Sinai to Gaza intensified, thereby alarming Israel.
Moreover, reports of self-proclaimed jihadis from abroad regrouping in Sinai—with access to military grade arms smuggled in from Libya and Sudan—suggested the early stages of a longer-term problem for the United States’ global counterterrorism strategy.

Meanwhile, Morsi’s softer approach to dealing with the kidnappings and killings of Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai through mediation with tribal chiefs, rather than the standard military response, made him appear naïve and unfit to rule in the eyes of his military.
In stark contrast to the hardline stance of Mubarak, Morsi tasked his regime with holding meetings with tribal elders to hear their complaints and their ideas on how to end the bloodshed in the Sinai and the Rafah crossing.
Government representatives employed the unconventional tactic of encouraging an intellectual and jurisprudential revision of the interpretations of religious doctrine by extremists, who issued fatwas to authorize killing innocent people.

In November 2012, Morsi rejected outright General el-Sisi’s request to crack down on alleged terrorists in Sinai, reportedly stating, “I don’t want Muslims to shed the blood of fellow Muslims.”

The military interpreted Morsi’s softer approach as evidence of his conflicted loyalties: between his sympathies with extremist Islamist groups—notwithstanding his rejection of their use of violence—and his obligations as President to preserve security in Sinai.

 

[Howey]

As I've stated before, the Egyptian people are done with it. They are demanding a non-sectarian government.