Did Israel miscalculate in launching the war on Iran?
In recent days, alongside continued claims of successes in this war, a new tone is emerging in Israel’s media, piercing the Israeli sense of invincibility — the first hints of a narrative of defeat.Writing in Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper on March 25, Yossi Yehoshua detailed tensions between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Mossad chief David Barnea regarding the failure of plans to collapse the Iranian regime.
Three days earlier, The New York Times had reported that in January, Barnea presented US officials with a plan to induce a successful insurrection after regime decapitation was carried out. The Mossad chief would not have taken such messages to Washington without the approval of his prime minister.
The sense of crisis became more palpable when Israeli army chief Eyal Zamir warned the security cabinet that the military could “collapse in on itself”, particularly due to manpower shortages.
When the political and security echelons begin playing the blame game in the midst of a war, it is never a good sign. This is not where Israel anticipated the conversation would be one month after launching a joint attack with the United States against Iran.
When the war began, the prevailing sense in Israel was one of euphoria. Senior Israeli officials hailed the “unprecedented” and “historic” coordination with the US, including two meetings and 15 phone calls between Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump in the preceding two months.
uncomfortable questions are increasingly starting to percolate: are some of Israel’s assumptions about what could be achieved in a war involving the US being upended? Can Iran’s “mosaic” strategy not only survive, but deliver greater endurance and impose significant costs?
Did Israel miscalculate in launching the war on Iran?
Like in other conflicts, Israel launched the war on Iran together with the US without a realistic political plan.