I think plaintiff's response to the motion for summary judgment in Perry v. Schwarzenegger pretty well dispenses with the idea that Baker v. Nelson controls here.
http://www.domawatch.org/cases/9thc...l_Intrvnr_Joint_Opp_to_Def_Int_MSJ_092309.pdf -----Pages 7 -9
"1. The Supreme Court’s summary dismissals are binding on lower courts only “on the precise
issues presented and necessarily decided” by the Court. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)
(per curiam) (emphasis added). In several respects, the issues in Baker are different from the issues
presented by Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to Prop. 8. For example, Baker presented an equal
protection challenge based only on sex discrimination and therefore cannot conceivably foreclose
Plaintiffs’ claim that Prop. 8 discriminates against gay and lesbian individuals on the basis of their
sexual orientation. See Jurisdictional Statement at 16, Baker (No. 71-1027) (“The discrimination in
this case is one of gender.”).
Moreover, in addition to the absence of any issue of discrimination based on sexual
orientation in Baker, the Supreme Court’s summary dismissal in that case addressed equal protection
and due process challenges to a marriage framework that is far different from the one that Plaintiffs
are challenging here, and therefore cannot be controlling on any component of Plaintiffs’ equal
protection and due process claims. Whereas Baker concerned the constitutionality of an outright
refusal by a State to afford any recognition to same-sex relationships, Plaintiffs’ suit challenges
California voters’ use of the ballot initiative process to strip unmarried gay and lesbian individuals of
their state constitutional right to marry and to relegate them to the inherently unequal institution of
domestic partnership. Whatever the constitutional flaws in Minnesota’s blanket denial of recognitiont
o same-sex relationships, Prop. 8 is uniquely irrational: California voters used the initiative process
to single out unmarried gay and lesbian individuals for a “special disability” (Romer, 517 U.S. at 631)
by extinguishing their state constitutional right to marry, while at the same time preserving the
existing marriages of gay and lesbian couples and affording unmarried gay and lesbian individuals
the right to enter into domestic partnerships that carry virtually all the same rights and obligations—
but not the highly venerated label—associated with opposite-sex marriages (and existing same-sex
marriages). The Supreme Court had no occasion in Baker to consider the constitutionality of such an
arbitrary legal framework under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause----AND SO ON
SO,Despite the persuasive legal arguments against it as controlling SCOTUS precedent, Baker v. Nelson does seem to provide a court finding that "marriage" means an opposite-sex couple.
What they said was this:
from your link--
"Minn.St. c. 517, which governs "marriage," employs that term as one of common usage, meaning the state of union between persons of the opposite sex. It is unrealistic to think that the original drafts-men of our marriage statutes, which date from territorial days, would have used the term in any different sense. The term is of contemporary significance as well, for the present statute is replete with words of heterosexual import such as "husband and wife" and "bride and groom" (the latter words inserted by L.1969, C. 1145, § 3, subd.3).
We hold, therefore, that Minn.St. c. 517 does not authorize marriage between persons of the same sex and that such marriages are accordingly prohibited."
Their argument is not that "marriage" can't "mean" anything other than an opposite-sex couple; their argument is that the statute referred to and authorized only opposite-sex marriage. So same-sex marriage, not being explicitly authorized, is implicitly prohibited. So, the justices in Baker also blindly accepted the validity of gender specificity without really examining it.