OrnotBitwise
Watermelon
Actually, anyone can chime in. I'm just particularly interested in AOI's take since he (A) has some expertise in the aread, (B) has expressed opinions on related subjects and (C) is not from the U.S. and so has a less biased perspective.
I'm reading Woodward's State of Denial in fits and starts, mostly on the train home in the evenings. He's not a particularly good writer, but the subject matter is compelling.
During the first year of the occupation we had, according to Woodward, a vertiable Keystone Kops comedy of errors. Not so much a perfect storm as a case of having, not only the wrong tools, but no one capable of recognizing the fact. One factor underlies almost all others, however: the U.S. military was neither trained nor equiped for the jobs which Rumsfeld intended for them. Indeed, the whole culture of the military disdained such roles.
One U.S. diplomat summed the problem up this way:
I'm reading Woodward's State of Denial in fits and starts, mostly on the train home in the evenings. He's not a particularly good writer, but the subject matter is compelling.
During the first year of the occupation we had, according to Woodward, a vertiable Keystone Kops comedy of errors. Not so much a perfect storm as a case of having, not only the wrong tools, but no one capable of recognizing the fact. One factor underlies almost all others, however: the U.S. military was neither trained nor equiped for the jobs which Rumsfeld intended for them. Indeed, the whole culture of the military disdained such roles.
One U.S. diplomat summed the problem up this way:
First, do you think that this is a reasonable characterization and, more importantly, what do you think it would take to change it? Ironically, Rumsfeld wanted to change it. He was just entirely the wrong man for the job.. . . the U.S. Army was a highly offense-oriented organism that hated peacekeeping, civil action, training other forces and playing defense.