That is because “[r]edistricting legislatures
will . . . almost always be aware of racial demographics,”
Miller, 515 U. S., at 916, but such “race consciousness does
not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination,”
Shaw, 509 U. S., at 646. Section 2 itself “demands consideration of race.” Abbott, 581 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4).
The question whether additional majority-minority districts can be drawn, after all, involves a “quintessentially
race-conscious calculus.” De Grandy, 512 U. S., at 1020.
At the same time, however, race may not be “the predominant factor in drawing district lines unless [there is] a compelling reason.” Cooper, 581 U. S., at 291. Race predominates in the drawing of district lines, our cases explain,
when “race-neutral considerations [come] into play only after the race-based decision had been made.” Bethune-Hill
v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 580 U. S. 178, 189 (2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted). That may occur where
“race for its own sake is the overriding reason for choosing
one map over others.” Id., at 190.
While the line between racial predominance and racial
consciousness can be difficult to discern, see Miller, 515
U. S., at 916, it was not breached here. The Caster plaintiffs relied on illustrative maps produced by expert Bill
Cooper. See 2 App. 591–592. Cooper testified that while it
was necessary for him to consider race, he also took several
other factors into account, such as compactness, contiguity,
and population equality. Ibid. Cooper testified that he gave
all these factors “equal weighting.” Id., at 594. And when
asked squarely whether race predominated in his development of the illustrative plans, Cooper responded: “No. It
was a consideration. This is a Section 2 lawsuit, after all.
But it did not predominate or dominate.” Id., at 595.
