Russia Is Making Even More Money on Energy under Sanctions Regime

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Why is the bungling Biden regime so convinced that sanctions will eventually compel Vladimir Putin to stop the invasion of Ukraine?

Yesterday, bungling Biden’s national-security adviser, Jake 'the Snake' Sullivan, pledged that, “We will continue to squeeze the Russian economy so that Russia and the Kremlin feel the pain from what they have done in Ukraine. And in the meantime, we will keep working on additional ways to deny them revenue.”

There are still plenty of ways for Russia to sell its goods on a global market.

From oil exports . . .

Russia expects to earn 798.4 billion rubles ($9.6 billion) in additional revenue from energy sales in April due to high oil prices.

. . . to exploitable loopholes for oil sales to Europe . . .

When is a cargo of Russian diesel not a cargo of Russian diesel? The answer is when Shell Plc, the largest European oil company, turns it into what traders refer to as a Latvian blend.

The point is to market a barrel in which only 49.99% comes from Russia; in Shell’s eyes, as long as the other 50.01 percent is sourced elsewhere, the oil cargo isn’t "technically" of Russian origin.

. . . to natural-gas exports . . .

Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom continued to supply natural gas to Europe via Ukraine on Wednesday in line with requests from European consumers.

The request for gas exports to Europe through Ukraine had been set at 108.3 million cubic meters for April 6, similar to the request for April 5.

. . . to Russian coal exports:

European Union envoys are set to approve on Thursday a ban on Russian coal that would take full effect from mid-August, a month later than initially planned, two EU sources told Reuters, following pressure from Germany to delay the measure.

Add it all up, and somehow Russia is actually going to make way more money from energy exports this year than last year, despite having invaded Ukraine on February 24: “Bloomberg Economics expects Russia will earn about $320 billion from energy exports this year, up by more than a third from 2021. The ruble has already rebounded to its pre-war price against the dollar.”



https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/russia-is-making-even-more-money-on-energy-under-sanctions-regime
 
russia-ukraine-war-040722-25.jpg




Why is the bungling Biden regime so convinced that sanctions will eventually compel Vladimir Putin to stop the invasion of Ukraine?

Yesterday, bungling Biden’s national-security adviser, Jake 'the Snake' Sullivan, pledged that, “We will continue to squeeze the Russian economy so that Russia and the Kremlin feel the pain from what they have done in Ukraine. And in the meantime, we will keep working on additional ways to deny them revenue.”

There are still plenty of ways for Russia to sell its goods on a global market.

From oil exports . . .

Russia expects to earn 798.4 billion rubles ($9.6 billion) in additional revenue from energy sales in April due to high oil prices.

. . . to exploitable loopholes for oil sales to Europe . . .

When is a cargo of Russian diesel not a cargo of Russian diesel? The answer is when Shell Plc, the largest European oil company, turns it into what traders refer to as a Latvian blend.

The point is to market a barrel in which only 49.99% comes from Russia; in Shell’s eyes, as long as the other 50.01 percent is sourced elsewhere, the oil cargo isn’t "technically" of Russian origin.

. . . to natural-gas exports . . .

Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom continued to supply natural gas to Europe via Ukraine on Wednesday in line with requests from European consumers.

The request for gas exports to Europe through Ukraine had been set at 108.3 million cubic meters for April 6, similar to the request for April 5.

. . . to Russian coal exports:

European Union envoys are set to approve on Thursday a ban on Russian coal that would take full effect from mid-August, a month later than initially planned, two EU sources told Reuters, following pressure from Germany to delay the measure.

Add it all up, and somehow Russia is actually going to make way more money from energy exports this year than last year, despite having invaded Ukraine on February 24: “Bloomberg Economics expects Russia will earn about $320 billion from energy exports this year, up by more than a third from 2021. The ruble has already rebounded to its pre-war price against the dollar.”



https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/russia-is-making-even-more-money-on-energy-under-sanctions-regime

Just what we need, another Putin cheer leader on this forum.
 
When morons use biased sites, next on Fox!

Russia has defaulted on its foreign debt, says S&P

London (CNN Business)Russia has defaulted on its foreign debt because it offered bondholders payments in rubles, not dollars, credit ratings agency S&P has said.

Russia attempted to pay in rubles for two dollar-denominated bonds that matured on April 4, S&P said in a note on Friday. The agency said this amounted to a "selective default" because investors are unlikely to be able to convert the rubles into "dollars equivalent to the originally due amounts."

According to S&P, a selective default is declared when an entity has defaulted on a specific obligation but not its entire debt.

Moscow has a grace period of 30 days from April 4 to make the payments of capital and interest, but S&P said it does not expect it will convert them into dollars given Western sanctions that undermine its "willingness and technical abilities to honor the terms and conditions" of its obligations.
 
The Biden regime has a bad habit of whistling past the graveyard, insisting that everything is going swimmingly and according to plan, while the evidence mounts that its efforts are a day late and a dollar short.

And no one in the bungling bureaucracy is more guilty of insisting “all is well” than Big Guy Biden himself: “There’s nobody suggesting there’s unchecked inflation on the way — no serious economist.” “It happens every single, solitary year: There is a significant increase in the number of people coming to the border in the winter months of January, February, March.” “I trust the capacity of the Afghan military, who is better trained, better equipped, and more re- — more competent in terms of conducting war.” “I’m going to shut down the virus.” “I didn’t over-promise. I have probably outperformed what anybody thought would happen.”

But as the war approaches its third month, there’s yet another dispiriting disconnect between bungling Biden’s tough talk — “The ruble almost is immediately reduced to rubble,” “Russia’s economy is reeling,” “For God’s sake, he cannot be allowed to stay in power” — and what the U.S. effort is really doing to Putin and his cronies.

It is yet another case of this idiot over-promising and under-delivering.


https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/russia-is-making-even-more-money-on-energy-under-sanctions-regime/
 
Of course they are. Anyone not seeing that would occur is an economic dumbass, like all Democrats.
 
notice this is not even from sales to China. which add more cash

So you and “copy and paste” are telling us that Russia currently is hurt by the sanctions? that their economy is moving along smoothly? that the Russian people aren’t feeling the pain economically from Putin’s crusade?
 
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In 2001, a Goldman Sachs economist named Jim O'Neill thought of the term "BRIC" to describe a bloc of countries, which he believed would grow from "emerging economies" to the dominant force in global trade (Rached 91).

At the time, O'Neill predicted that the four countries encompassed in the acronym—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—would eventually outpace and eclipse what were then known as the G8 countries: the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan.

Note one detail: when Jim O'Neill coined this term, Russia straddled the two classifications, as Russia tends to do.

Russia has been readying itself to be severed from the West since before the twenty-first century began.

While the West paid minimal attention, Russia invested time and money to build a global support system in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, especially a development bank, founded in 2015, from which only 18% of approved loans went to Russia but 82% went to Africa, Africa, and South America.

The loans were earmarked for essential services: transport (29%), water/sanitation (22%), urban and social needs (15%), energy (26%), and agriculture (8%).

With investments in key regional hubs — Brazil, South Africa, China, and India — Russians deliberately placed the hinges of three large continents in the hands of leaders who had obligations to Moscow and reasons to view Putin favorably. This helps to explain why so many countries rejected the sanctions the United States called for.

As Giovanni Barbieri noted, as early as 2015, Russia was already working with China and India, as well as other nations, on "the internationalization of [China's] domestic currency." The plan to carve out a global economy free from the dominance of the dollar was in the works long before the most recent sanctions over Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

There's ample evidence that Russia isn't paying as much attention to us as we think it is.

Many Americans may be mistaken about who constitutes Russia's main audience. During the overheated English-language coverage of Ukraine, stern moral pronouncements by bungling Biden and other Western leaders imply that the West thinks Russia is listening to us and values the hope of staying in our good graces.

A review of the international relations scholarship provides us with an intriguing arc from 2001 to now. Today, ironically, BRIC and G8 no longer exist. In their place are BRICS and G7. In 2009, the original BRIC foursome decided to take ownership of the name, and they formed an interregional partnership. The following year, they inducted a fifth member, South Africa.

Four years after BRIC became BRICS, the G8 became the G7. Why did the G8 lose one member? The year was 2014, and Russia was sanctioned, then kicked out of the power club because of its invasion of Crimea. Therefore, eight years ago, a line was drawn between two economic realms: one clearly led by the United States, rich, heavily industrialized, and united by the Bretton Woods financial system, the other led largely by China, but also by India and Russia in their own way, more modest in consumption, on their way to development but not quite there yet, and — quite significantly — united in little beyond their common feeling that they needed to create an alternative system to Bretton Woods.

BRICS has been projected to buoy four more emerging economies known as MINT: Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey, the grouping Razia Khan dubs "the next generation of developing economies that will achieve great importance".

I would recommend taking the time to look through the articles listed at the end of this essay. It may scare you, but Russia has been thorough and thoughtful about carving out an alternative universe where the dollar is not supreme, the United States can't tell people what to do, and countries can engage in international relations without the tiresome burden of post-Renaissance European colonialism.


https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2022/04/why_brics_and_mint_might_save_russia_and_sink_the_us.html

Barbieri, Giovanni. "Beyond Ideology: A Reassessment of Regionalism and Globalism in IR Theory, Using China as a Case Study." In Revisiting Regionalism and the Contemporary World Order: Perspectives from the BRICS and Beyond, edited by Élise Féron, Jyrki Käkönen, and Gabriel Rached, 1st ed., 225–52. Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xjn.15.

Bridle, Richard, and Anna Geddes. "CASE STUDY: SOUTH AFRICA: Beyond Fossil Fuels: Fiscal Transition in BRICS." International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22016.

Garg, Vibhuti, and Anna Geddes. "CASE STUDY: INDIA: Beyond Fossil Fuels: Fiscal Transition in BRICS." International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22014.

Gerasimchuk, Ivetta, and Yuliia Oharenko. "CASE STUDY: RUSSIA: Beyond Fossil Fuels: Fiscal Transition in BRICS." International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22015.

Gerasimchuk, Ivetta, Kjell Kühne, Joachim Roth, Anna Geddes, Yuliia Oharenko, Richard Bridle, and Vibhuti Garg. "Clean Energy Transition Versus Fossil Fuel Path Dependence." Beyond Fossil Fuels: Fiscal Transition in BRICS. International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21911.5.

Khan, Razia. "An Extra Strong MINT." The World Today 70, no. 1 (2014): 12–18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24640739.

Kühne, Kjell, and Joachim Roth. "Beyond Fossil Fuels: Fiscal Transition in BRICS." International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22013.

McDonald, Terry, and Benjamin Klasche. "Foot in the Door: China's Investments in the Arctic Region." In Revisiting Regionalism and the Contemporary World Order: Perspectives from the BRICS and Beyond, edited by Élise Féron, Käkönen, and Gabriel Rached, 1st ed., 201–22. Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xjn.14.

Mikhaylenko, E. B., and I. M. Adami. "Coping with the Changing World Order: The Case of Russia." In Revisiting Regionalism and the Contemporary World Order: Perspectives from the BRICS and Beyond, edited by Élise Féron, Jyrki Käkönen, and Gabriel Rached, 1st ed., 157–78. Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xjn.12.

Muresan, Arina, and Philani Mthembu, eds. "Outcomes from the 11th BRICS Summit 2019." Brazil's 2019 Chairship of the BRICS: Charting a Course for 2020. Institute for Global Dialogue, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25335.5.

Muresan, Arina. "Understanding the Role of the BRICS Partnership: Strategic Ways Forward." South Africa in the World 2020: Pragmatism versus Ideology. Institute for Global Dialogue, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep30587.9.

Naidu, Sanusha, Chisola Chembe, Jesuloba Ilesanmi, Remofiloe Lobakeng, and Simphiwe Mongwe. "BRICS under Pressure." Edited by Arina Muresan and Philani Mthembu. South Africa in the World Navigating a Changing Global Order. Institute for Global Dialogue, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25336.11.

Naik, Shraddha. "The Emergence of BRICS: An Extension of Interregionalism to the Global South." In Revisiting Regionalism and the Contemporary World Order: Perspectives from the BRICS and Beyond, edited by Élise Féron, Jyrki Käkönen, and Gabriel Rached, 1st ed., 61–82. Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xjn.8.

Naude, Bianca. "Regionalism as Resistance?: South Africa's Utopia of Souths." In Revisiting Regionalism and the Contemporary World Order: Perspectives from the BRICS and Beyond, edited by Élise Féron, Jyrki Käkönen, and Gabriel Rached, 1st ed., 105–30. Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xjn.10.

PRINSLOO, CYRIL. "Bolsonaro and the BRICS: Bull in a China Shop?" South African Institute of International Affairs, 2019. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep25947.

Prys-Hansen, Miriam, and Detlef Nolte. "BRICS Und IBSA: Die Clubs Der Aufsteigenden Mächte Verlieren an Glanz." German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2016. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep21163.

Rached, Gabriel. "BRICS and the Emergent Countries in the Twenty-First Century: Discussing Contemporary Perspectives." In Revisiting Regionalism and the Contemporary World Order: Perspectives from the BRICS and Beyond, edited by Gabriel Rached, Élise Féron, and Jyrki Käkönen, 1st ed., 83–104. Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2019. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvr00xjn.9.

Ujvari, Balazs. BRICS Bloc(k) Rising? European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06761.
 
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