A Supreme Leader Loses His Aura as Iranians Flock to the Streets

FUCK THE POLICE

911 EVERY DAY
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/opinion/21tehran.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss


A Supreme Leader Loses His Aura as Iranians Flock to the Streets


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By ROGER COHEN
Published: June 20, 2009

TEHRAN — The Iranian police commander, in green uniform, walked up Komak Hospital Alley with arms raised and his small unit at his side. “I swear to God,” he shouted at the protesters facing him, “I have children, I have a wife, I don’t want to beat people. Please go home.”

A man at my side threw a rock at him. The commander, unflinching, continued to plead. There were chants of “Join us! Join us!” The unit retreated toward Revolution Street, where vast crowds eddied back and forth confronted by baton-wielding Basij militia and black-clad riot police officers on motorbikes.

Dark smoke billowed over this vast city in the late afternoon. Motorbikes were set on fire, sending bursts of bright flame skyward. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, had used his Friday sermon to declare high noon in Tehran, warning of “bloodshed and chaos” if protests over a disputed election persisted.

He got both on Saturday — and saw the hitherto sacrosanct authority of his office challenged as never before since the 1979 revolution birthed the Islamic Republic and conceived for it a leadership post standing at the very flank of the Prophet. A multitude of Iranians took their fight through a holy breach on Saturday from which there appears to be scant turning back.

Khamenei has taken a radical risk. He has factionalized himself, so losing the arbiter’s lofty garb, by aligning himself with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against both Mir Hussein Moussavi, the opposition leader, and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a founding father of the revolution.

He has taunted millions of Iranians by praising their unprecedented participation in an election many now view as a ballot-box putsch. He has ridiculed the notion that an official inquiry into the vote might yield a different result. He has tried pathos and he has tried pounding his lectern. In short, he has lost his aura.

The taboo-breaking response was unequivocal. It’s funny how people’s obsessions come back to bite them. I’ve been hearing about Khamenei’s fear of “velvet revolutions” for months now. There was nothing velvet about Saturday’s clashes. In fact, the initial quest to have Moussavi’s votes properly counted and Ahmadinejad unseated has shifted to a broader confrontation with the regime itself.

Garbage burned. Crowds bayed. Smoke from tear gas swirled. Hurled bricks sent phalanxes of police, some with automatic rifles, into retreat to the accompaniment of cheers. Early afternoon rumors that the rally for Moussavi had been canceled yielded to the reality of violent confrontation.

I don’t know where this uprising is leading. I do know some police units are wavering. That commander talking about his family was not alone. There were other policemen complaining about the unruly Basijis. Some security forces just stood and watched. “All together, all together, don’t be scared,” the crowd shouted.

I also know that Iran’s women stand in the vanguard. For days now, I’ve seen them urging less courageous men on. I’ve seen them get beaten and return to the fray. “Why are you sitting there?” one shouted at a couple of men perched on the sidewalk on Saturday. “Get up! Get up!”

Another green-eyed woman, Mahin, aged 52, staggered into an alley clutching her face and in tears. Then, against the urging of those around her, she limped back into the crowd moving west toward Freedom Square. Cries of “Death to the dictator!” and “We want liberty!” accompanied her.

There were people of all ages. I saw an old man on crutches, middle-aged office workers and bands of teenagers. Unlike the student revolts of 2003 and 1999, this movement is broad.

“Can’t the United Nations help us?” one woman asked me. I said I doubted that very much. “So,” she said, “we are on our own.”

The world is watching, and technology is connecting, and the West is sending what signals it can, but in the end that is true. Iranians have fought this lonely fight for a long time: to be free, to have a measure of democracy.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic revolution, understood that, weaving a little plurality into an authoritarian system. That pluralism has ebbed and flowed since 1979 — mainly the former — but last week it was crushed with blunt brutality. That is why a whole new generation of Iranians, their intelligence insulted, has risen.

I’d say the momentum is with them for now. At moments on Saturday, Khamenei’s authority, which is that of the Islamic Republic itself, seemed fragile. The revolutionary authorities have always mocked the cancer-ridden Shah’s ceding before an uprising, and vowed never to bend in the same way. Their firepower remains formidable, but they are facing a swelling test.

Just off Revolution Street, I walked into a pall of tear gas. I’d lit a cigarette minutes before — not a habit but a need — and a young man collapsed into me shouting, “Blow smoke in my face.” Smoke dispels the effects of the gas to some degree.

I did what I could and he said, “We are with you” in English and with my colleague we tumbled into a dead end — Tehran is full of them — running from the searing gas and police. I gasped and fell through a door into an apartment building where somebody had lit a small fire in a dish to relieve the stinging.

There were about 20 of us gathered there, eyes running, hearts racing. A 19-year-old student was nursing his left leg, struck by a militiaman with an electric-shock-delivering baton. “No way we are turning back,” said a friend of his as he massaged that wounded leg.

Later, we moved north, tentatively, watching the police lash out from time to time, reaching Victory Square where a pitched battle was in progress. Young men were breaking bricks and stones to a size for hurling. Crowds gathered on overpasses, filming and cheering the protesters. A car burst into flames. Back and forth the crowd surged, confronted by less-than-convincing police units.

I looked up through the smoke and saw a poster of the stern visage of Khomeini above the words, “Islam is the religion of freedom.”

Later, as night fell over the tumultuous capital, gunfire could be heard in the distance. And from rooftops across the city, the defiant sound of “Allah-u-Akbar” — “God is Great” — went up yet again, as it has every night since the fraudulent election. But on Saturday it seemed stronger. The same cry was heard in 1979, only for one form of absolutism to yield to another. Iran has waited long enough to be free.
 
Watch Rafsanjani.

His actions will decide the outcome of all of this. He is probably Iran's richest man, was a respected founder of the Republic, and sits at the head of the Expediency Council; the one group with the power to recall or remove the Supreme Leader.

Unless Rafsanjani moves to have the Council dismiss Khameini, this "green revolution" will come to nothing.
 
Also, I've spent about six hours in the last day furthering my already extensive knowledge of the Iranian government and its history. One of the most surprising things my further study turned up was that Iran has basically been ruled by four or five individuals who have served in a variety of different positions since '79.

The original Khomeini was one. Rafsanjani and Montezari are another two. And Khameini and Mousavi.

Montezari, best known ATM for being Mousavi's choice to replace Khameini as Supreme Leader, was originally supposed to succeed Khomeini as Supreme Leader but he lost his position in the succession after cricisizing the violent suppression of a student demonstration in the late eighties. The Supreme Leader, by tradition, is supposed to be the most senior cleric in Iran. Khameini was elevated to Ayatollah at the last minute so that he could assume the position of Supreme Leader, but he is not Iran's most senior cleric. Montezari was Khomeini's original first choice to succeed him, and it appears that many see Khameini's tenure as SL as conflicting with Khomeini's vision.
 
Watch Rafsanjani.

His actions will decide the outcome of all of this. He is probably Iran's richest man, was a respected founder of the Republic, and sits at the head of the Expediency Council; the one group with the power to recall or remove the Supreme Leader.

Unless Rafsanjani moves to have the Council dismiss Khameini, this "green revolution" will come to nothing.

The military certainly isn't going to come to the aid of the population. Without that, any revolution that goes anywhere beyond protests is going to turn into nothing but a mass slaughter.

Rasfanjani is the head of the Assembly of Experts (he also chairs the Expediency Council, but that's different) but he doesn't control them. Unless Khameini fucks up big time, I'm not sure what Rasfanjani is going to be able to do. But he is certainly an ally of Mousavi, and Mousavi is now taking the radical step of calling for the dismissal of Khameini.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assembly_of_Experts

Wikipedia says that 65 members of the 86 people in the Assembly of Experts are close associates of Rafsanjani. The dismissal of Khameini may depend on how outrageous and undefendable his actions become, which would make Rafsanjani's job much easier. I'm not sure if Mousavi will get his desired reformist supreme leader, or the constitutional reform, but a more moderate (and out of the way) supreme leader would certainly be welcome, along with another election.
 
Bottom Line: There is a lot more potential for regime change than I originally thought there was, but a lot less potential for a wholesale remolding of Iran's system of government.

My initial expectation was that this would be protested for a few days and die out with Ahmadinejad staying as President. Seeing the power of the individuals involved on both sides, however, has made me hope that another opportunity is possible. Rafsanjani is nearly as politically powerful as Khameini, and he has staked out a position as being opposed to Ahmadinejad (he lost to him as president in '04) and cautious toward Khameini. If Rafsanjani decides to throw in in favor of Mousavi, we could be looking at the first real test of whether Iran is a republic or a dictatorship. Theoretically, the Expediency Council has the power to remove the Supreme Leader and appoint another one, but this has never been done before. It could well be that even if Rafsanjani convinces the rest of the Expediency Council to oust Khameini, the Revolutionary Guard would forcibly maintain Khameini's position and disregard the Council.

We're in uncharted territory here. And here are a couple of points I think are important to remember:

1.) Rafsanjani has a lot to lose. He is Iran's richest man. He benefits from the current system of government and is unlikely to want to change the system that enriched him. A popular uprising that did away with the Islamic Republic would probably result in the nationalization of most of his property, so he has no reason to push for massive change.

2.) Rafsanjani personally dislikes Ahmadinejad and Khameini. He lost to Ahmadinejad in '04, and has been a rival of Supreme Leader Khameini for some time. Also, Khameini just authorized the arrest of Rafsanjani's daughter, which is unlikely to do much to heal relations between them.

It seems likely that Rafsanjani would push for Khameini's dismissal if he could. We will find out at the upcoming meeting of the Expediency Council whether he has that kind of influence over the council. Whether Khameini would give up the post if ordered, however, is still an unknown matter.
 
Montezari, best known ATM for being Mousavi's choice to replace Khameini as Supreme Leader, was originally supposed to succeed Khomeini as Supreme Leader but he lost his position in the succession after cricisizing the violent suppression of a student demonstration in the late eighties. The Supreme Leader, by tradition, is supposed to be the most senior cleric in Iran. Khameini was elevated to Ayatollah at the last minute so that he could assume the position of Supreme Leader, but he is not Iran's most senior cleric. Montezari was Khomeini's original first choice to succeed him, and it appears that many see Khameini's tenure as SL as conflicting with Khomeini's vision.

Khomeini dismissed Montezari himself for being to bold in calling for liberalization. Maybe Khameini doesn't collude with Khomeini's vision, but Khomeini was no angel. He was the one who came up with the convulted Iranian government, designed to make the role of the people irrelevant.

I don't think it was a student demonstration that was repressed in the 80's. The government murdered 18k political prisoners in 1988, which alarmed Montezari. As his views became increasingly outspoken, Khomeni eventually parted ways with Montezari. This was a year before Khomeni died; it's kind of a tragedy that Montezari didn't keep his mouth shut, and let the Iranian people be stuck with Khameini.
 
The military certainly isn't going to come to the aid of the population. Without that, any revolution that goes anywhere beyond protests is going to turn into nothing but a mass slaughter.

Rasfanjani is the head of the Assembly of Experts (he also chairs the Expediency Council, but that's different) but he doesn't control them. Unless Khameini fucks up big time, I'm not sure what Rasfanjani is going to be able to do. But he is certainly an ally of Mousavi, and Mousavi is now taking the radical step of calling for the dismissal of Khameini.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Assembly_of_Experts

Wikipedia says that 65 members of the 86 people in the Assembly of Experts are close associates of Rafsanjani. The dismissal of Khameini may depend on how outrageous and undefendable his actions become, which would make Rafsanjani's job much easier. I'm not sure if Mousavi will get his desired reformist supreme leader, or the constitutional reform, but a more moderate (and out of the way) supreme leader would certainly be welcome, along with another election.

I said Expediency Council several times where I meant Assembly of Experts.
 
Khomeini dismissed Montezari himself for being to bold in calling for liberalization. Maybe Khameini doesn't collude with Khomeini's vision, but Khomeini was no angel. He was the one who came up with the convulted Iranian government, designed to make the role of the people irrelevant.

I don't think it was a student demonstration that was repressed in the 80's. The government murdered 18k political prisoners in 1988, which alarmed Montezari. As his views became increasingly outspoken, Khomeni eventually parted ways with Montezari. This was a year before Khomeni died; it's kind of a tragedy that Montezari didn't keep his mouth shut, and let the Iranian people be stuck with Khameini.

Yeah it definitely is a shame that Montezari didn't stay quiet for a little longer. I think he just thought his position was secured by being Iran's most senior cleric and from being so integral in the early days. Calling the PMOI political dissidents might be a bit of an understatement though. Read about them. They are an interesting group, but they are far from angels. They have assassinated several leaders of the Revolution in Iran.
 
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/06/where-is-rafsanjani.html

It was reported that the Assembly of Experts made a letter in support of Khameni's statements, but it later became apparent that that was only signed by the Deputy Leader, who is a rival of Rasfanjani and a support of a Ahmadinejad. The opinion of the Assembly of Experts is, therefore, unclear. So, beyond that we aren't certain, I can't say anything about the Assembly of Experts. It's important to note that Rasfanjani has made statements and does believe that the election was fraudulent. His side in this battle is pretty clear.
 
The reason I phrased that statement about conflicting visions is because Mousavi did too in his speech. He said that this is not what Khomeini intended for Iran, and that sentiment seems to be getting some traction. If there is ultimately a regime change, I think arguments like that is what will drive it, rather than arguments against the existence of the Republic in the first place.

I have mixed feelings about the Iranian system of government. Obviously I'm not particularly fond of theocracy, but I find the hybrid of elected and unelected institituions to be extremely fascinating and maybe not even a particularly bad idea when implemented correctly.
 
The military is supposed to have around 1 million members counting reservists, and is considered to be more nationalist and less religious than the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij militia.
 
The reason I phrased that statement about conflicting visions is because Mousavi did too in his speech. He said that this is not what Khomeini intended for Iran, and that sentiment seems to be getting some traction.

He has to say that. That was their revolution, he was their leader, and a very important figure nationally. But I don't think Khomeini would've been a friend of the reform movement today if he were in charge today.

If there is ultimately a regime change, I think arguments like that is what will drive it, rather than arguments against the existence of the Republic in the first place.

I have mixed feelings about the Iranian system of government. Obviously I'm not particularly fond of theocracy, but I find the hybrid of elected and unelected institituions to be extremely fascinating and maybe not even a particularly bad idea when implemented correctly.

I find that libertarians, socialist, and theocrats usually aren't huge fans of democracy; they don't hate it per se, but they don't accept the will of the people as the ultimate deciding factor either. They consider their ideology the ultimate deciding factor, because, after all, it's perfect. How exactly are you supposed to mix unelected and elected elements practically? What single factor in an unelected branch could you get almost everyone to say is more important than the will of the people? How would you prevent cronyism and corruption - as happened in Iran?

I drew up the plan the other day of drawing a thousand people at lot and making a legislative chamber out of those who can best prove themselves on a relatively reasonable logic test; even that would probably be considered terribly elitist, even though it was an attempt to meld populism and meritocracy. And logic isn't an all encompassing thing that would guarantee good laws either; it would help, but I can't think of a single testable factor that would guarantee that the people would write good laws. And good laws to whom? It's a relativistic notion, at its core.
 
The military is supposed to have around 1 million members counting reservists, and is considered to be more nationalist and less religious than the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij militia.

If Khamenie's actions become outrageous, and the council of experts refuses to take action, and the public becomes extremely angry, revolution with the help of the military would be the last option. I can't say for certain how likely it is, myself not being an expert on the Iranian state.
 
He has to say that. That was their revolution, he was their leader, and a very important figure nationally. But I don't think Khomeini would've been a friend of the reform movement today if he were in charge today.



I find that libertarians, socialist, and theocrats usually aren't huge fans of democracy; they don't hate it per se, but they don't accept the will of the people as the ultimate deciding factor either. They consider their ideology the ultimate deciding factor, because, after all, it's perfect. How exactly are you supposed to mix unelected and elected elements practically? What single factor in an unelected branch could you get almost everyone to say is more important than the will of the people? How would you prevent cronyism and corruption - as happened in Iran?

I drew up the plan the other day of drawing a thousand people at lot and making a legislative chamber out of those who can best prove themselves on a relatively reasonable logic test; even that would probably be considered terribly elitist, even though it was an attempt to meld populism and meritocracy. And logic isn't an all encompassing thing that would guarantee good laws either; it would help, but I can't think of a single testable factor that would guarantee that the people would write good laws. And good laws to whom? It's a relativistic notion, at its core.

Calm down. I said it was interesting. It is.

There should be, and in most nations there are, some checks and restrictions on the ability of a majority of citizens to impose their will upon the rest of the nation. This usually requires an unelected body of some sort. In the US we have an institution serving that function (SCOTUS) and several mechanisms to prevent a majority from completely imposing their will (veto, filibuster, etc).

There should be some body in every government that is insulated from public opinion and is capable of taking a longer range view of the country's trajectory.
 
It's just as important to make good laws as it is to prevent bad laws from being made. That's why the veto and filibuster should be abolished. Tyranny of the minority.
 
According to this, Iran is currently basically in revolution:

https://sites.google.com/site/tatsumairanupdate/

This is a source inside Iran. Which side the army comes out for will ultimately decide the revolution. They could stay on the sidelines and for the revolutionary guard to stay with them, they could join with the revolutionary guard and crush the revolution, or they could join with the people.

The state media is running videos of Obama with false translations saying that he supports the protesters. So, his restraint has been useless. The fact that it's Obama probably makes it a lot less damaging than it otherwise would be, but it does disgust me and shows what a totalitarian dictatorship the place.
 
Bottom Line: There is a lot more potential for regime change than I originally thought there was, but a lot less potential for a wholesale remolding of Iran's system of government.

My initial expectation was that this would be protested for a few days and die out with Ahmadinejad staying as President. Seeing the power of the individuals involved on both sides, however, has made me hope that another opportunity is possible. Rafsanjani is nearly as politically powerful as Khameini, and he has staked out a position as being opposed to Ahmadinejad (he lost to him as president in '04) and cautious toward Khameini. If Rafsanjani decides to throw in in favor of Mousavi, we could be looking at the first real test of whether Iran is a republic or a dictatorship. Theoretically, the Expediency Council has the power to remove the Supreme Leader and appoint another one, but this has never been done before. It could well be that even if Rafsanjani convinces the rest of the Expediency Council to oust Khameini, the Revolutionary Guard would forcibly maintain Khameini's position and disregard the Council.

We're in uncharted territory here. And here are a couple of points I think are important to remember:

1.) Rafsanjani has a lot to lose. He is Iran's richest man. He benefits from the current system of government and is unlikely to want to change the system that enriched him. A popular uprising that did away with the Islamic Republic would probably result in the nationalization of most of his property, so he has no reason to push for massive change.

2.) Rafsanjani personally dislikes Ahmadinejad and Khameini. He lost to Ahmadinejad in '04, and has been a rival of Supreme Leader Khameini for some time. Also, Khameini just authorized the arrest of Rafsanjani's daughter, which is unlikely to do much to heal relations between them.

It seems likely that Rafsanjani would push for Khameini's dismissal if he could. We will find out at the upcoming meeting of the Expediency Council whether he has that kind of influence over the council. Whether Khameini would give up the post if ordered, however, is still an unknown matter.

Can someone just explain to me why the President of Iran has such a cool name like Ahmadinejad, while the leaders of the Council have bland names that all sound alike?
 
I feel a huge amount of hope for those that will live through, and feel sad for those that will die in this mess.
 
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