impotent old man threatens NKorea if they make threats~unlike the 1,000's in the past

The following chronology summarizes in greater detail developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and the efforts to end them, since 1985.

Skip to: 1985, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017

1985
December 12, 1985: North Korea accedes to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) but does not complete a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under Article III of the NPT, North Korea has 18 months to conclude such an arrangement. In coming years, North Korea links adherence to this provision of the treaty to the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea.

1991
September 27, 1991: President George Bush announces the unilateral withdrawal of all naval and land-based tactical nuclear weapons deployed abroad. Approximately 100 U.S. nuclear weapons had been based in South Korea. Eight days later, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev reciprocates.

November 8, 1991: In response to President Bush’s unilateral move, President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea announces the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, under which South Korea promises not to produce, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. In addition, the declaration unilaterally prohibits South Korea from possessing nuclear reprocessing or uranium enrichment facilities. These promises, if enacted, would satisfy all of North Korea’s conditions for allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.

December 31, 1991: The two Koreas sign the South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the declaration, both countries agree not to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons” or to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” They also agree to mutual inspections for verification.

1992
January 30, 1992: More than six years after signing the NPT, North Korea concludes a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

March 6, 1992: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea’s Lyongaksan Machineries and Equipment Export Corporation and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for missile proliferation activities.*

April 9, 1992: North Korea ratifies the safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

May 4, 1992: North Korea submits its nuclear material declarations to the IAEA, declaring seven sites and some 90 grams of plutonium that could be subject to IAEA inspection. Pyongyang claims that the nuclear material was the result of reprocessing 89 defective fuel rods in 1989. The IAEA conducted inspections to verify the completeness of this declaration from mid-1992 to early 1993.

June 23, 1992: The United States imposes “missile sanctions” on the North Korean entities sanctioned in March.*

September 1992: IAEA inspectors discover discrepancies in North Korea’s “initial report” on its nuclear program and ask for clarification on several issues, including the amount of reprocessed plutonium in North Korea.

1993
February 9, 1993: The IAEA demands special inspections of two sites that are believed to store nuclear waste. The request is based on strong evidence that North Korea has been cheating on its commitments under the NPT. North Korea refuses the IAEA’s request.

March 12, 1993: Amid demands for special inspections, North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT in three months, citing Article X provisions that allow withdrawal for supreme national security considerations.

April 1, 1993: The IAEA declares that North Korea is not adhering to its safeguards agreement and that it cannot guarantee that North Korean nuclear material is not being diverted for nonpeaceful uses.

June 11, 1993: Following talks with the United States in New York, North Korea suspends its decision to pull out of the NPT just before the withdrawal would have become legally effective. North Korea also agrees to the full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards.

For its part, the United States grants assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons. Washington also promises not to interfere with North Korea’s internal affairs.

July 19, 1993: After a second round of talks with the United States, North Korea announces in a joint statement that it is “prepared to begin consultations with the IAEA on outstanding safeguards and other issues” and that it is ready to negotiate IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. The joint statement also indicates that Pyongyang might consider a deal with the United States to replace its graphite nuclear reactors with light-water reactors (LWRs), which are proliferation resistant.

Late 1993: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency estimate that North Korea had separated about 12 kilograms of plutonium. This amount is enough for at least one or two nuclear weapons.

1994
January 1994: The director of the CIA estimates that North Korea may have produced one or two nuclear weapons.

February 15, 1994: North Korea finalizes an agreement with the IAEA to allow inspections of all seven of its declared nuclear facilities, averting sanctions by the United Nations Security Council.

March 1, 1994: IAEA inspectors arrive in North Korea for the first inspections since 1993.

March 21, 1994: Responding to North Korea’s refusal to allow the inspection team to inspect a plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, the IAEA Board of Governors approves a resolution calling on North Korea to “immediately allow the IAEA to complete all requested inspection activities and to comply fully with its safeguards agreements.”

May 19, 1994: The IAEA confirms that North Korea has begun removing spent fuel from its 5-megawatt nuclear research reactor even though international monitors were not present. The United States and the IAEA had insisted that inspectors be present for any such action because spent fuel can potentially be reprocessed for use in nuclear weapons.

June 13, 1994: North Korea announces its withdrawal from the IAEA. This is distinct from pulling out of the NPT—North Korea is still required to undergo IAEA inspections as part of its NPT obligations. The IAEA contends that North Korea’s safeguards agreement remains in force. However, North Korea no longer participates in IAEA functions as a member state.

June 15, 1994: Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter negotiates a deal with North Korea in which Pyongyang confirms its willingness to “freeze” its nuclear weapons program and resume high-level talks with the United States. Bilateral talks are expected to begin, provided that North Korea allows the IAEA safeguards to remain in place, does not refuel its 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, and does not reprocess any spent nuclear fuel.

July 9, 1994: North Korean President Kim Il Sung dies and is succeeded by his son, Kim Jong Il.

August 12, 1994: An “agreed statement” is signed that establishes a three-stage process for the elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In return, the United States promises to move toward normalized economic and diplomatic relations and assures North Korea that it will provide assistance with the construction of proliferation-resistant LWRs to replace North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors.

October 21, 1994: The United States and North Korea conclude four months of negotiations by adopting the “Agreed Framework” in Geneva. To resolve U.S. concerns about Pyongyang’s plutonium-producing reactors and the Yongbyon reprocessing facility, the agreement calls for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that will require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which are still under construction. North Korea also allows the IAEA to verify compliance through “special inspections,” and it agrees to allow 8,000 spent nuclear reactor fuel elements to be removed to a third country.

In exchange, Pyongyang will receive two LWRs and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of the reactors. The LWRs will be financed and constructed through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), a multinational consortium.

Calling for movement toward full normalization of political and economic relations, the accord also serves as a jumping-off point for U.S.-North Korean dialogue on Pyongyang’s development and export of ballistic missiles, as well as other issues of bilateral concern.

November 28, 1994: The IAEA announces that it had confirmed that construction has been halted at North Korea’s Nyongbyon and Taochon nuclear facilities and that these facilities are not operational.

1995
March 9, 1995:KEDO is formed in New York with the United States, South Korea, and Japan as the organization’s original members.

1996
January 1996: North Korea agrees in principle to a meeting on missile proliferation issues, which had been requested in a letter by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Thomas Hubbard. However, Pyongyang contends that the United States would have to ease economic sanctions before it could agree on a date and venue for the talks.

In testimony before a House International Relations subcommittee on March 19, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord says that Washington is willing to ease economic sanctions if progress is made on the missile export issue.

April 21-22, 1996: The United States and North Korea meet in Berlin for their first round of bilateral missile talks. The United States reportedly suggests that North Korea should adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary international agreement aimed at controlling sales of ballistic missile systems, components, and technology. North Korea allegedly demands that the United States provide compensation for lost missile-related revenue.

May 24, 1996: The United States imposes sanctions on North Korea and Iran for missile technology-related transfers. The sanctions prohibit any imports or exports to sanctioned firms and to those sectors of the North Korean economy that are considered missile-related. The pre-existing general ban on trade with both countries makes the sanctions largely symbolic.*

October 16, 1996: After detecting North Korean preparations for a test of its medium-range Nodong missile, the United States deploys a reconnaissance ship and aircraft to Japan. Following several meetings in New York between U.S. and North Korean diplomats, the State Department confirms on November 8 that the missile test has been canceled..



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https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron
 
Well, we are in a bit of a mess.

I mean, i'd feel a little more confident if someone had, say, thought of a plan at some point either before, during or immediately after taking a decision to leave.
Oh ye of little faith, the EU countries are fucked without the City of London providing the financial muscle for many and varied projects. We also have a deficit of over $60 billion with the EU and are the second largest export market for German cars. Toyota has already announced a £240 million upgrade to their plant in Derbyshire. This could easily be used to build Lexus here if BMWs and Mercs become more expensive.

In addition, the French would be screwed if we started drinking far more Australian and New Zealand wines because of zero tariffs and started importing lamb, cheese and dairy products again. We could also get our beef from the Argentine like we used to as well.

You sound like somebody that's been institutionalised for many years and are terrified to go outside. Embrace freedom, you have nothing to lose but your chains.
 
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You'll get no argument here.

So, what do we do? Make another deal they'll just ignore?

Great, glad you asked. Disclaimer, I am making suggestions without all the cards.

I see no way around 1. either attacking NK and eliminating the threat or 2. living with them having a nuclear deterrent capability

As to 1. this would require the most covert diplomacy possible. Identify the stakeholders, approach them, ask what they would require of us in exchange for a hands off approach should we decide to commit this war crime and attack. If the terms are suitable and feasible do it.
I'm assuming the 6 party talks adequately identifies the stakeholders. Foremost is the problem that south korea is going to get their hair messed up. No way around it. As far as China and Russia go, some sort of bribe, territorial or otherwise. We can't lose the element of surprise
and any stakeholder could foil.

Or we could welcome NK into the nuclear club.

Pick
 
Bullshit. We've made a billion deals with NK. The problem is they don't keep them.

yes. which means their word is worthless.And they can't be trusted to be in the club.
I hate to say it, but the only real solution is to take out her nukes
 
They really think Trump is barely functional, even after what he did in the election lol.

There's no convincing them otherwise.

Do you really need a list of political success stories featuring unstable sociopathic narcissistic snap jerk egomaniacs?
People are STOOPID. The appearance of confidence goes a long way. I've known people who wing it throughout life and manage to flourish without an iota of actual substantive competency.
They aren't stupid, they are smart, but lazy and use a confidence game in lieu of actually being good at the task. I think they call it salesmanship. Anyway, that's fine when the salesman is
an advocate, but an incompetent salesman selling himself is a problem. Enter Trump.
A sucker is born every minute. All that....

Ok I'm tired of being brilliant.
 
yes. which means their word is worthless.And they can't be trusted to be in the club.
I hate to say it, but the only real solution is to take out her nukes

I feel you. I don't think we can make the moral case when how many S Korean and N Korean lives will be lost.
There is no question if China and Russia signed off we could end the problem in a giant fireball. The moral case is impossible,
and the strategic advantage will be fleeting. How would history judge us?
 
Do you really need a list of political success stories featuring unstable sociopathic narcissistic snap jerk egomaniacs?
People are STOOPID. The appearance of confidence goes a long way. I've known people who wing it throughout life and manage to flourish without an iota of actual substantive competency.
They aren't stupid, they are smart, but lazy and use a confidence game in lieu of actually being good at the task. I think they call it salesmanship. Anyway, that's fine when the salesman is
an advocate, but an incompetent salesman selling himself is a problem. Enter Trump.
A sucker is born every minute. All that....

Ok I'm tired of being brilliant.

You must be wide awake then.
 
I feel you. I don't think we can make the moral case when how many S Korean and N Korean lives will be lost.
There is no question if China and Russia signed off we could end the problem in a giant fireball. The moral case is impossible,
and the strategic advantage will be fleeting. How would history judge us?
the strategic advantage is removing their nuclear boot from our neck. I don't think it has to be a nuclear war-
in fact if it was nuclear then i'd be very hesitant to the point of relying on our continuing ABM system.

we should be able to do it with conventional weapons,but it's still gonna be a terrible war.
The problem is not doing anything is unacceptable also with lil Kim's rhetoric/behavior.

I guess we just keep trying to pull in China ( Russia has limited sway) and hope they finally get it that they are seriously risking a war on their border -which in no way servers China.

It's all very dicey..We need cool heads, and we need clear minds and follow our protocols.
 
yes. which means their word is worthless.And they can't be trusted to be in the club.
I hate to say it, but the only real solution is to take out her nukes

Let's assume NK gains a nuclear deterrent, that does not mean NK is suicidal. They aren't getting one to launch. Let's face it, we can always nuke them, that's always an option. And what kind of crazy would they have to be to attack the United States?
That's just suicide. They don't need the USA to commit suicide. They can slit their own throats any day they decide to. So, I'm afraid we ride this out and maybe some better opportunity will emerge before they have the deterrent. And on the upside
Trump won't go down as a mass murderer.
 
Let's assume NK gains a nuclear deterrent, that does not mean NK is suicidal. They aren't getting one to launch. Let's face it, we can always nuke them, that's always an option. And what kind of crazy would they have to be to attack the United States?
That's just suicide. They don't need the USA to commit suicide. They can slit their own throats any day they decide to. So, I'm afraid we ride this out and maybe some better opportunity will emerge before they have the deterrent. And on the upside
Trump won't go down as a mass murderer.
the thing is...is lil Kil a rational actor or not?
I'm in no hurry to do anything,but if events keep going sour, i think our hand is eventually forced
 
don't be a dunce. Trump's rhetoric is just that. It's a warning

I said cold war 2 is inviting a tripwire war -the brinksmanship
is more then rhetoric when it involves flybys etc. we are not buzzing NK.

The potential for war is there- it's been there for what..50 years? we manage it by the DMZ
There are some similarities to the DMZ and NATO- but not necessarily NATO expansion that forces Putin's hand.

I fact we have been trying to give lil Kim wiggle room ( unlike Russia)..but it's not working

You need to learn the terms or use your own terms judiciously
It was a bad way to warn, N Korea has already made a threat, Trunp's warning was vague, did he mean verbal threat or did he mean a physical one?

If he doesn't react to the threat about Guam it weakens Trump, or this was some people's thinking on drawing lines.
 
the thing is...is lil Kil a rational actor or not?
I'm in no hurry to do anything,but if events keep going sour, i think our hand is eventually forced

All I can say is he doesn't need to be that sane, just not suicidal. He doesn't need to be the Pope or a chess wizard to understand the US will turn their country to glass if he were to attack.
If he is suicidal, drink some bleach. So we need a "rational actor" in only the most broad sense, the "not suicidal megalomaniacal mass murderer" sense. There is some wiggle room there.
 
It was a bad way to warn, N Korea has already made a threat, Trunp's warning was vague, did he mean verbal threat or did he mean a physical one?

If he doesn't react to the threat about Guam it weakens Trump, or this was some people's thinking on drawing lines.
it's a threat that if lil Kim keeps doing this- events are going to cause a war. Trump is laying down a marker.
No more business as usual- the days of kicking the can down the road have brought us to a precipice

I'm less concerned with his actual words then with him laying down the marker this cannot stand when he's armed.
We can't allow a nuclear N.Korea with the hostile lil Kim at the helm.
It's too unstable,and the risks are then too high
 
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