Was Hiroshima an act of terrorism?

Not only is that not provably true, but you really think nuking on spec of a more desired future is humane?
The Kremlin could say the same about DC

Correct which is why I said "I'm guessing". Alternate timelines are fun for speculation, but in the end we are stuck in the one we are in. You are guessing, just like me.
 
Correct which is why I said "I'm guessing". Alternate timelines are fun for speculation, but in the end we are stuck in the one we are in. You are guessing, just like me.

Sure. The calculation in the most crass terms is simple in hindsight. Did the lives taken with the two bombs exceed the number that would have been taken had they not been deployed, or not.
The issue is the roads not taken. Japan could have called the bluff and fought on. They believed we had more. We did not.

In foresight it was a complete mystery. So the use can only be described as war crime. The architect admitted it.

I like a world with several actors having MAD deterrent. A unipolar nuclear power would be catastrophic even the most benevolent could not resist urges to exploit.
But not more than several trusted ones, as proliferation that we have is a risk that is all too apparent.
 
Sure. The calculation in the most crass terms is simple in hindsight. Did the lives taken with the two bombs exceed the number that would have been taken had they not been deployed, or not.
The issue is the roads not taken. Japan could have called the bluff and fought on. They believed we had more. We did not.

In foresight it was a complete mystery. So the use can only be described as war crime. The architect admitted it.

I like a world with several actors having MAD deterrent. A unipolar nuclear power would be catastrophic even the most benevolent could not resist urges to exploit.
But not more than several trusted ones, as proliferation that we have is a risk that is all too apparent.
I'm not sure what you are trying to say. Well, it is after 4:20.
 
FWIW, I've been to Hiroshima. I was sent TAD to Iwakuni, Japan for a month in December 1983. It was joint use base with the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force. It was easy SAR duty; 24 hours on/48 hours off. Hiroshima was an hour away by narrow-gauge train. We walked around and saw the A-bomb dome, rang a peace bell next to the museum and toured the museum. Out of respect for Japanese-American relations I didn't wear my "Nuke'em till they glow" t-shirt. Interesting displays and not a single mention of Pearl Harbor, Corregidor, the Philippines, Nanking, etc. Just that fact the Americans dropped an atom bomb on them there.
 
That's lunacy, so you're trying to say that they'd use nuclear bombs to clear beaches,
Note this discussion between General John E. Hull (one of General Marshall's top aides) and Colonel Lyle E. Seeman (one of General Groves' top aides) on August 13, 1945:

General Hull: That is the information I wanted. The problem now is whether or not, assuming the Japanese do not capitulate, continue on dropping them every time one is made and shipped out there or whether to hold them up as far as the dropping is concerned and then pour them all on in a reasonably short time. Not all in one day, but over a short period. And that also takes into consideration the target that we are after. In other words should we not concentrate on targets that will be of the greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, etc.

Colonel Seeman: Nearer the tactical use rather than other use.

General Hull: That is what it amounts to. What is your own personal reaction to that?

Colonel Seeman: I have studied that a good deal. Our own troops would have to be about six miles away I am not sure that the Air Forces could place it within 500 feet of the point we want. Of course, it is not that "pinpoint". Then the stage of development has to be considered. The work it is liable to be used for the more or less has to be explosive effect. It would be just a gamble putting or sending those troops though.

General Hull: Not the same day or anything like that. We might do it a couple or three days before. You plan to land on a certain beach. Behind which you know there is a good road communication and maybe a division or two of Japanese troops. Neutralization of that at some time from H Hour of the landing back earlier, maybe a day or two or three. I don't anticipate that you would be dropping it as we do other type bombs that are in support of the infantry. I am thinking about neutralizing a division or a communication center or something so that it would facilitate the movement ashore of troops.

Colonel Seeman: That is the preferable use at this time from that standpoint. The weapon we have is not a penetration weapon. The workmanship is not as good as possible. It is much better than average workmanship. We are still developing it though.

General Hull: From this on more or less of the timing factor, how much time before the troops actually go into that area do you think would be the safety factor? Suppose you did get a dud or an incomplete explosion, what safety factor should you consider, one, two, three days?

Colonel Seeman: I think we are sending some people over to actually measure that factor. I think certainly by within 48 hours that could be done. Everything is going so fast. We would like to train people and get them in a combat spirit to do that. I think the people we have are the best qualified in that line. Of course, as you say, if it is used back in a kind of reserve line or in a reserve position or a concentration area but that you wouldn't be up against right away.

General Hull: I don't think you would land at eight o'clock in the morning and you would drop it at six o'clock, out the day before, even from the tactical standpoint without regard to when it fails to go off or something like that.

Colonel Seeman: Another thing you may be likely to consider is that while you are landing you might not want to use it as it could be a dud. It is not something that you fool around with.

https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/72.pdf


And this interview with General Marshall in 1957:

Page 26

There were supposed to be nine more bombs completed in a certain time. And they would be largely in time for the first landing in the southern tip of Japan. There were three corps to come in there as I recall. They didn’t know about it at the time but I had gone very carefully into the examinations out in New Mexico as to the after-effects of the bomb because we were having in mind exploding one or two bombs before these landings and then having the landing take place and reserving the other bomb or bombs for the later movements of any Japanese reinforcements that might try to come up. And it was decided then that the casualties from the actual fighting would be very much greater than might occur from the after-effects of the bomb action. So there were to be three bombs for each corps that was landing. One or two, but probably one as a preliminary, then the landing, then another one further inland against the immediate supports and then the third one against any troops that might try to come through the mountains from up on the Inland Sea. And that was the rough idea in our minds.

http://www.marshallfoundation.org/l...ites/16/2014/05/Marshall_Interview_Tape14.pdf



how many US soldiers would have died from irradiation?
The radiation injuries at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were sustained in the first few seconds of the explosions.

However, had a bomb failed to explode and instead fizzled when it hit the ground, there would have been a small fallout plume. It looks like they were going to wait a couple days to let radiation subside though, and presumably troops would not linger in a fallout plume.



Curtis Le May had absolutely no qualms about firebombing Tokyo and killing 100,000 civilians. Yet even be baulked at the use of nuclear weapons
Where and when did LeMay balk at the use of nuclear weapons?
 
Nope. The behind the scenes deal was already nearly finished. Japan was done, as Ike and Leahy said. But what do they know compared to you? We could have leveled those cities like we did the others and not used nukes. We owned the skies. We firebombed many. many cities and in some cities, killed more than the Abomb could have. It was a show of strength and a scientific experiment. They spent over a trillion dollars making those 2 bombs and were not going to skip seeing what they could do.
I know you want to believe that stuff, but it just isn't true. It is what the victor says when it is over. They write the history. That is why we say we did not torture, but we did. We say we did not gun down unarmed citizens and children, but we did.

.
 
Nope. The behind the scenes deal was already nearly finished.
That is incorrect. There was no behind the scenes deal.


Japan was done, as Ike and Leahy said.
Japan was free to surrender at any time. We'd have been happy to accept their surrender before the A-bombs were dropped.


But what do they know compared to you?
Appeals to authority are a logical fallacy.

That said, can you point out any place where their views differ from anything that I said?


We could have leveled those cities like we did the others and not used nukes.
Kokura Arsenal and Niigata perhaps. But Nagasaki was difficult to find using the radar guidance that our nighttime conventional raids needed to direct their planes.

And all the Japanese soldiers who were killed at Hiroshima probably would have taken cover had they known that a large conventional raid was headed their way.

Additionally we would have lost the ability to use nukes to try to scare the Japanese government into surrendering.

Besides, what is so special about conventional weapons that we would prefer them over nukes?


It was a show of strength
A show of strength designed to intimidate the government of Japan into surrendering.


and a scientific experiment. They spent over a trillion dollars making those 2 bombs and were not going to skip seeing what they could do.
They had already seen what they could do. We conducted the Trinity test before dropping A-bombs on Japan.


I know you want to believe that stuff, but it just isn't true.
That is incorrect. History really did happen.


It is what the victor says when it is over. They write the history.
"Japan's Longest Day" was written by Japanese historians.


That is why we say we did not torture, but we did.
Got any evidence of that?


We say we did not gun down unarmed citizens and children, but we did.
Got any evidence of that?
 
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Thanks for your justification of mass murder and terrorism. If confirms everything I've thought about you and, hopefully, others will see the same. No wonder your little country is a hot mess.

You've got it back-asswards, nuke-head. The Zionists invaded, mass-murdered and terrorized indigenous Palestinians. This isn't denied by any record save the rantings of prosemitic madmen , neoZionist fanatics and white American evangelical assholes- three categories in which your ilk are sure to be located.


Haw, haw...................................haw.
 
Oppenheimer opposed bombing Nagasaki.
"[Oppenheimer] traveled to Washington on August 17 to hand-deliver a letter to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson expressing his revulsion and his wish to see nuclear weapons banned.[SUP][119][/SUP]
If that is August 17 1945 then the war was already over at that point.


In October 1945 Oppenheimer was granted an interview with President Harry S. Truman. The meeting, however, went badly, after Oppenheimer remarked he felt he had "blood on my hands". The remark infuriated Truman and put an end to the meeting. Truman later told his Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson "I don't want to see that son-of-a-bitch in this office ever again."[SUP][120][/SUP]
The war was definitely already over in October 1945.


By military targets you mean the Mitsubishi factories?
At Nagasaki, yes. But note that Nagasaki was only the second alternate. That A-bomb was really meant for Kokura Arsenal.

They screwed up by not reserving Yokohama for the A-bombs. It would have made a much better alternate target than Nagasaki did.
 
Nope. The behind the scenes deal was already nearly finished. Japan was done, as Ike and Leahy said. But what do they know compared to you? We could have leveled those cities like we did the others and not used nukes. We owned the skies. We firebombed many. many cities and in some cities, killed more than the Abomb could have. It was a show of strength and a scientific experiment. They spent over a trillion dollars making those 2 bombs and were not going to skip seeing what they could do.
I know you want to believe that stuff, but it just isn't true. It is what the victor says when it is over. They write the history. That is why we say we did not torture, but we did. We say we did not gun down unarmed citizens and children, but we did.

To mind this explains the dilemma the Japanese faced and baa never really been dicussed in any detail here. They considered Hirohito to be a god and unconditional surrender would probably have resulted in many millions committing suicide. I blame Truman and Stimson for that, they were fools!

Much has been written about the vagueness of the Allies' call for "unconditional surrender". This vagueness, combined with many hostile references to Japan's leaders (Henry Stimson & McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service In Peace and War, pg. 626; Butow, pg. 136), contributed heavily to the conclusion by many in Japan that unconditional surrender could mean the end of their Emperor. Even Foreign Minister Togo, one of the leaders of Japan's doves, noted in a July 12, 1945 message to Sato, Japan's Ambassador to Moscow, "as long as America and England insist on unconditional surrender, our country has no alternative but to see it [the war] through in an all-out effort". The telegram was intercepted by the U.S., decoded, and sent to President Truman (U.S. Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg. 873, 875-876).

Robert Butow has aptly portrayed the feelings the Japanese had for the Emperor, in noting, "The one thing they could not do was sign a death warrant for the imperial house", and if it appeared that the Allies would take steps against the Emperor, "then even the most ardent advocates of peace would fall into step behind the [pro-war] fanatics" (Butow, pg. 141).

General MarshallTo demand unconditional surrender, without comment as to the Emperor's fate, meant a choice, Truman thought, between an invasion of the Japanese mainland or the use of atomic bombs on Japan, or possibly both. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall thought that even after using A-bombs on Japan the invasion would still be necessary, anyway, as opposed to the belief that using atomic bombs on Japan would make the mainland invasion unnecessary (David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume Two, pg. 198).

Most high-level discussions that assumed either nuclear weapons or a mainland invasion of Japan would be necessary to end the Pacific war did so with the knowledge that unconditional surrender was the official Allied policy. The "a-bombs or invasion" choice was based in part on the assumption that retention of the Emperor would probably not be offered to Japan. Nor was a warning to Japan of the atomic bomb in the decision-makers' plans, as they considered what would be necessary to end the war. These omissions made the use of the atomic bomb seem all the more necessary for winning the war without an invasion.

http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
 
Robeson: What an interesting person you plucked out.

About the only outsider who did anything for us when the tories were out to destroy us entirely here at the end of the 'thirties. Magnificent sportsman, actor and singer, great speaker, a fine product of his Country - and look what it did for him!
 
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