Hundreds of Army Social Scientists Unqualified, Former Boss Says
"Nearly five years after the Army began a controversial program to embed social scientists in combat units, the former director and chief bureaucratic force behind the program says that over a third of those researchers never should have been part of the program in the first place...When HTS began, it was seen as a way for the military to overcome its near-crippling ignorance about the cultural, political and social landscapes of the war zones it was fighting in. The idea behind HTS was to give local infantry commanders their own set of cultural advisers. They’d poll the locals, map out tribal alliances, and sort out the real power brokers from the blowhards.
With that information in hand, the HTS leaders promised, American forces could win battles while firing a fraction of the bullets they did before. “In a counterinsurgency, your level of success is inversely proportional to the amount of lethal force that you expend,” McFate said in 2008.
The first test of the HTS went almost too well to be believed, with a local commander in Afghanistan crediting his Human Terrain Team with an astonishing 60 to 70 percent drop in the number of bombs-and-bullets strikes he had to make. The program grew exponentially, to 27 teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. But no commander ever made a similar boast about HTS’ influence. And complaints about the program’s recruits metastasized, making the program look like an unworthy enterprise.
One of its translators was charged with espionage. Another team member shot and killed an Afghan civilian. Several teams were reshuffled during their deployment for a variety of competence concerns.
Some members were taken hostage, and three died during their deployments. There was at least one mass staffer exodus.
External problems compounded as well. Professional anthropological associations blasted the program for subordinating anthropology to U.S. military objectives. Out of concerns for the program’s ability to conduct oversight over its field teams, Congress ordered for the Army to conduct an investigation into the program’s utility...U.S. Central Command wants nine new Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan by the summer...
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/human-terrain-unqualified/
"Nearly five years after the Army began a controversial program to embed social scientists in combat units, the former director and chief bureaucratic force behind the program says that over a third of those researchers never should have been part of the program in the first place...When HTS began, it was seen as a way for the military to overcome its near-crippling ignorance about the cultural, political and social landscapes of the war zones it was fighting in. The idea behind HTS was to give local infantry commanders their own set of cultural advisers. They’d poll the locals, map out tribal alliances, and sort out the real power brokers from the blowhards.
With that information in hand, the HTS leaders promised, American forces could win battles while firing a fraction of the bullets they did before. “In a counterinsurgency, your level of success is inversely proportional to the amount of lethal force that you expend,” McFate said in 2008.
The first test of the HTS went almost too well to be believed, with a local commander in Afghanistan crediting his Human Terrain Team with an astonishing 60 to 70 percent drop in the number of bombs-and-bullets strikes he had to make. The program grew exponentially, to 27 teams in Iraq and Afghanistan. But no commander ever made a similar boast about HTS’ influence. And complaints about the program’s recruits metastasized, making the program look like an unworthy enterprise.
One of its translators was charged with espionage. Another team member shot and killed an Afghan civilian. Several teams were reshuffled during their deployment for a variety of competence concerns.
Some members were taken hostage, and three died during their deployments. There was at least one mass staffer exodus.
External problems compounded as well. Professional anthropological associations blasted the program for subordinating anthropology to U.S. military objectives. Out of concerns for the program’s ability to conduct oversight over its field teams, Congress ordered for the Army to conduct an investigation into the program’s utility...U.S. Central Command wants nine new Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan by the summer...
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/12/human-terrain-unqualified/