Libya News and Interests

[dukkha]

Oil crisis deepens in Libya as losses exceed $3 billion / Mar 12,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy...ceed-3-billion

The oil crisis in Libya is deepening as a blockade of the country’s vital oil fields generated losses of more than $3 billion, the national oil corporation announced late Thursday.

The war-torn country controls vast oil reserves, the biggest in Africa, and typically pumps out 1.2 billion barrels a day.

But its regular oil production ground to a halt in January when tribes loyal to eastern-based forces seized large export terminals and choked off major pipelines, jeopardizing the national economy that relies heavily on oil revenues.

The National Oil Corporation reported that production had been reduced to a trickle of 97,500 barrels a day. It warned of a looming fuel shortage given the government’s inability to pay for imports.

The country’s oil wealth has long been at the center of strife between opposition forces under the command of Khalifa Hifter and the U.N.-backed government based in the capital, Tripoli.

Since last April, Hifter’s forces have been laying siege to the capital. Fighting has largely settled into a stalemate.

By leveraging their control of much of Libya’s east and south, Hifter’s allies seek to choke off cash flow to their adversary, the Tripoli-based administration, which runs Libya’s central bank.

The bank’s monthly statement published earlier this week shows it continues to pay for fuel and food subsidies and holds billions of dollars in foreign reserves. But since January it has withheld salaries from civil servants and eliminated funding for development projects because of the blockade and plunging oil prices.

[anatta]

Russian Plan to Restore Qaddafi’s Regime Backfired
https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/r...085516665.html

April get-together was the Russians’ last of at least three meetings with Qaddafi’s son that year, according to Libyan officials, and he was brimming with plans. Saif Al-Islam wanted them to pass a message to Moscow that he had compromising material on Western politicians showing they’d received campaign contributions from his family. He proposed that together they “think about how this information could be used,” one of the Russians noted in a memo at the time.

But the consultants weren’t there to discuss “kompromat,” a term for damaging material about a person that could be used for blackmail, extortion or public embarrassment.
They had bigger things in mind.

Almost eight years on from his ouster, the Russian consultants had been dispatched to plan the return of the Qaddafi regime.

The Kremlin had long thought about how it could maneuver its way back into Libya. Qaddafi’s downfall sidelined Moscow, leaving Italy, France and regional powers seeking the spoils while rival Libyan factions fought one civil war after another.

Moscow’s official line is that it works with all parties in Libya. Initially, Russia’s government kept contacts with both sides of the civil war while promoting Saif Al-Islam as a future president. By September of last year, however, Russia shifted to flat-out support for Khalifa Haftar, a rebel strongman who controls the east of the country, despite misgivings about his past connections to the U.S. and legendary unpredictability.

Russia’s Defense Ministry had maintained connections with Haftar for years, even hosting him aboard a Russian aircraft carrier off the Libyan coast in 2017. But different actors close to power in Russia have their own ideas of whom to back and how to support them.

Yevgeny Prigozhin, an insider also known as “Putin’s chef,” reckoned Saif Al-Islam could be a good bet for an investment in the country, according to three people familiar with his thinking. That was despite war-crimes charges against Saif Al-Islam and the fact he was in hiding.

A former restaurateur who found favor with President Vladimir Putin, Prigozhin branched out from catering into the mercenary business; he’s best known as boss of the Wagner private security company, which has sent fighters and political consultants to Ukraine, Syria and Libya, among other hotspots.

n 2018, he was indicted by a grand jury in the U.S. for his companies’ alleged role in trying to sway the 2016 presidential election.
Prosecutors have now dropped the charges against Prigozhin’s company, Concord Management and Consulting LLC,

Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli faltered despite backing from the U.A.E., dragging the warring sides into a stalemate in the city’s suburbs.
Wagner dispatched more than 1,400 mercenaries, but the move ultimately backfired because the desperate government in Tripoli turned to Turkey for military help, altering the balance of power in the conflict.

Haftar’s spokesman Ahmed Al-Mismari has denied that Russian mercenaries are fighting alongside his forces, but acknowledged there were Russian teams deployed to the east to help with maintenance of aircraft and weapons.
Putin has publicly distanced himself from the mercenaries, saying that even if they were in Libya, they had nothing to do with the Russian government. A spokesman for the Kremlin didn’t respond to a request for comment. Haftar’s spokesman didn’t respond either.

At one meeting, they discussed training consultants in neighboring Tunisia, and building up a group of “specialists” who would distribute messages over social media. “He’s very interested in counter-propaganda,” the Russians noted.

They presented him with a slide show, entitled, “Saif Qaddafi. Revival of Libya. Strategy.” It laid out steps for him to either become a candidate or support a leader in exchange for a role in a new government.
The Russian plan including organizing a “flash mob” of the Libyan community in The Hague. The slogan: “Safe with Saif.”

*next post*

[anatta]

Yevgeny Prigozhin "Putins chef"

~~
At their final meeting in April as covered in the notes, Saif Al-Islam promised to provide a list of military commanders loyal to him, and to make arrangements to receive personnel from what the Russians described in the memo as “our Sudanese company,” according to the files seized by the Libyans.

Shugaley and Seifan headed back to their Tripoli apartment, and were arrested soon after. A third Russian, Alexander Prokofiev, attended one of the meetings with Saif Al-Islam, according to the notes seized by prosecutors, but left the country before the others were arrested. In a phone interview,
Prokofiev said he and the others were in Libya to conduct political research, and denied they acted as consultants to Qaddafi’s son. “These are all far-fetched theories,” he said. Saif Al-Islam was just “one of our respondents.”

Prokofiev denied any links to Prigozhin, saying he worked for the Foundation for the Defense of National Values. The Moscow-based organization is headed by Alexander Malkevich, a former editor-in-chief of the USA Really news website, which is part of a media group that the U.S. linked to Prigozhin in its sanctions designation. Malkevich has also been targeted for U.S. sanctions for alleged involvement in elections interference.

In a statement, Malkevich’s Moscow-based organization said it had employed the two consultants in Libya but denied they were there to meddle in elections. The group made public its research, including opinion polls showing Haftar and Saif Al-Islam as Libya’s two most popular potential politicians, without mentioning consultancy work for Saif Al-Islam.

An aide to Saif Al-Islam confirmed he had met with the Russian consultants. He wanted good relations with Western countries too, but the Russians offered their help first, the aide said.

The two Russians are being held in a prison at Tripoli’s Mitiga airport, which also houses former senior regime officials and Islamist militants. The duo are accused of espionage and seeking to interfere in future elections.
When contacted by Bloomberg, a lawyer for the detainees declined to comment.

Russia has privately campaigned for their release. Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov has raised the issue with Libyan leaders, so far without success, according to people familiar with the matter.

Malkevich took out an ad in the Washington Post demanding the Russians’ freedom. The newspaper subsequently took down the ad and refunded his organization to avoid a possible violation of sanctions, which were imposed in Dec. 2018 and generally prohibit U.S. persons from doing business with him.

[dukkha]

A Bayraktar Mini UAV (H/T) 3/26/20

a tactical UAV, presumably operated on behalf of/to support the #LNA, that crashed and was captured by #GNA forces

[dukkha]

Libya frees more than 450 prisoners to stem spread of coronavirus

Announcement by Tripoli government's justice ministry comes as country reports eight cases of coronavirus infections.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/...093545745.html


Police in the western city of Misrata monitor a curfew imposed as part of precautionary measures against the coronavirus
~~

In a statement on Sunday, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) warned that ongoing violence in many parts of the country risked compromising response efforts in areas with already weak or collapsing health infrastructure.

Both the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) and the rival eastern-based government under the control of Haftar have taken preventative measures against the spread of the virus, including closing schools, some businesses, markets and even private clinics.

[dukkha]

[dukkha]

Libya crisis: How Haftar is quietly building forces in the Fezzan
Developments in the southwest region, comprising roughly a third of Libya’s territory, are of major relevance to the warring sides battling in Tripoli



A year ago, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive on Tripoli in a bid to oust Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) and its armed allies, ushering in a phase of unprecedented violence.

The siege of Tripoli by Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) continues, remaining the almost exclusive focus of reporting. The Fezzan, Libya’s long-neglected and haphazardly governed southwest, is often seen as a side stage to national conflict dynamics.

Yet, developments there have been of major relevance to the escalation in Tripoli, offering clues about the LAAF’s broader expansion strategy. Comprising roughly a third of Libya’s territory, the Fezzan is also a key asset for warring camps. It holds some of the country’s largest oil and water reserves and is Libya’s gateway to the Sahelo-Saharan zone.
Striking a chord

In a strategic move, Haftar deployed LAAF contingents from the eastern and central region in early 2019, ostensibly targeting “outlaws and foreign armed groups”. The narrative struck a chord among southerners tired of rampant crime and patchy security provision, at a time of overall dissatisfaction with the GNA. Many thus welcomed the arrival of LAAF forces.

The operation was successful in large part due to the LAAF’s gradual penetration of the Fezzan’s security scene over the previous two years. Using tribal politics to his advantage, Haftar had built relationships with certain social leaders and helped them enhance their influence within their communities.

The momentum created by the LAAF’s rapid advances and accompanying propaganda machine led more southern commanders to side with Haftar

As a consequence, he could count on a number of local armed groups in advance of his move and capitalise on the southern army officers' frustrations with the GNA’s lack of leadership and support.

The momentum created by the LAAF’s rapid advances and accompanying propaganda machine led more southern commanders to side with Haftar, as a way to salvage their position or monetise their endorsement.

The GNA scrambled to organise a counter-offensive, relying on marginal actors and hurried decisions with insufficient local buy-in.

In March 2019, most LAAF forces abruptly withdrew from the Fezzan, leaving the maintenance of the “new order” to their local allies. As the LAAF directed all its efforts to seizing the capital, the Fezzan shifted out of focus again.

By this point, it was clear that the Fezzan operation had served as a launchpad for the subsequent Tripoli offensive, bolstering the LAAF’s image and supplying new manpower.

In the Fezzan, stability remained elusive, as local militias reappeared on the streets and smuggling resumed. Ethnic tensions, which had been exacerbated by the LAAF’s entry into Murzuq, escalated into full-blown conflict.
Restructuring the security landscape

But there appears to be more to Haftar’s Fezzan strategy than a short-sighted power play. A closer look suggests he embarked on restructuring the security landscape in view of consolidating the LAAF’s presence throughout the south.

Southern armed groups typically derive their legitimacy from their tribal backbone and how embedded they are within their communities. The LAAF leadership has been reshaping these groups based on wartime priorities and to weaken parallel loyalties.

Small units are being absorbed into larger battalions that the LAAF has built up as privileged partners. Fighters have also been recruited as individuals, wresting them from their previous formations and reshuffling them in a way that breaks with conventional patterns of mobilisation. Though impacted by southern power dynamics, this restructuring process is essentially led from above.

Meanwhile, Haftar has invested in military structures that have been largely dysfunctional since 2011, giving leeway to trusted army officers.

A Gaddafi-era intelligence official and Haftar’s military governor of Kufra in the southeast, Major-General Belgasem Labaaj, is now in charge of all southern military zones. He has been touring the Fezzan since last autumn, strengthening ties with army cadres on the ground, admonishing corrupt local officials, and trying to broker a peace agreement in Murzuq.

Signs of dissatisfaction

In parallel to the LAAF’s military track, affiliated political authorities have stepped up their role. The interim government authorised fuel deliveries to the Fezzan, which has been starved of its usual western Libyan supply because of the war and the GNA cutting off LAAF-controlled areas.

Southern banks are being supplied with cash from the east, supplementing deliveries from the Central Bank in Tripoli. After initially objecting to municipal elections held under the GNA’s auspices last year, the interim government recently announced substantial budgets for southern municipalities - expecting local officials to distance themselves from the GNA.

The interim government has also been training and equipping auxiliary police forces under its interior ministry.

Signs of dissatisfaction are surfacing, however, and persistent crises may erode popular support for the pro-LAAF camp. A quarrel between the interim government and southern MPs about money for the south that went missing has caused outrage.

In a recent social media outburst, the frontman of the Fezzan Anger Movement - a grassroots network with a broad support base - spilled his anger about the “absent” interim government “that serves the east only”, as well as the “liar” Fayez al-Serraj, referencing a one-billion-dinar development fund that the GNA prime minister promised in December 2018 but never delivered.

Most southerners still have no access to subsidised fuel, since the eastern distribution network is overburdened, the east barely has enough to cover its own demand, and thus continue paying exorbitant black-market prices.

Since the start of 2020, the LAAF has taken new measures to contain the black market, but systemic corruption and the smugglers’ social protection limit their impact.
Far-ranging repercussions

The LAAF’s Fezzan expansion is a double-edged sword. Southerners expect the stronger leadership to enhance security and rein in armed groups. At the same time, LAAF patronage enables approved groups to act with greater impunity and to further their own interests.


Sharara oil field in southern Libya

The relationship between the LAAF leadership and its tribal backers is not one-directional, but based on mutual benefits and tradeoffs. This has potentially far-ranging societal repercussions, in terms of tribes, or tribal branches, seeking to further their territorial and political influence at the expense of their neighbours.

There are fears that the LAAF’s reinstatement of Gaddafi-era security officials could come at the cost of sustaining structural discrimination toward non-Arab ethnicities and reviving former mechanisms of social control. The southern fighters’ return from the northern frontlines will likely inflame tensions.

There are fears that the LAAF’s reinstatement of Gaddafi-era security officials could come at the cost of sustaining structural discrimination toward non-Arab ethnicities

Through its actions in the Fezzan, and previously in the east, the LAAF has demonstrated skill in navigating the local landscape, reactivating dormant networks and coopting aggrieved constituencies.

This holds clues to how it will pursue the recruitment of more groups in the northwest to aid its takeover. Yet, these trends are contingent on the trajectory of the conflict.

According to local sources, many southern actors sided with the LAAF because under the circumstances, they saw Haftar as being in the pole position to dominate the country.

But Turkey’s entry into the war strengthened the GNA’s position, and if Haftar is forced to back off from Tripoli, he may well lose ground in the Fezzan, too. Tribal support can be retracted and pro-LAAF figureheads can be replaced.

If the LAAF consolidates its territorial gains, the broader question is whether the ongoing restructuring and realignment processes can pave the way for deeper security sector reform. The national sense of purpose that the LAAF claims to embody is often praised as an antidote to the narrow tribal and localist interests driving conflict in Libya.
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinio...tQSmlbJ7GAu-6A

Yet, the LAAF’s hybrid nature and reliance on a broad range of actors with varying agendas constitute an obstacle to professionalising forces under centralised command.

This article draws on field research that the author conducted for a recently released Chatham House paper on the development of Libyan armed groups since 2014.

[dukkha]

Libya’s eastern-based forces trying to capture the country's capital bombed civilian homes on Friday, killing at least two people, health authorities in the U.N.-supported government in Tripoli said.

The intensified bombardment of the city by forces under the command of Khalifa Hifter came just days after their unilateral cease-fire declared for the Islamic holy month of Ramadan. The Tripoli-based government rejected the overture, blaming their rivals for sabotaging past peace efforts.

The health ministry in Tripoli also said that three civilians, including a woman, were wounded when rockets crashed through their roofs in the Zinata neihborhood, burying them under the rubble.

Hifter’s so-called Libyan Arab Armed Forces launched their assault on Tripoli last year, backed by the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Russia. For months his forces, bolstered by shipments of powerful missiles, jets and drones, held an advantage over the coalition of fractious militias defending the beleaguered Tripoli government. But Turkey’s escalating military support for the U.N.-supported administration has recently shifted momentum of the conflict.

Western forces have thwarted Hifter’s advances, recaptured coastal cities near the Tunisian border, attacked Hifter’s key western airbase and tightened their siege on his stronghold of Tarhuna. On Friday, their Facebook page reported launching at least three airstrikes on fuel tankers supplying Hifter’s forces and a bus full of militiamen. It warned humanitarian convoys carrying food and COVID-19 supplies to steer clear of areas of fighting or seek permission for the deliveries.

On both sides, fighting has taken a heavy toll on civilians. While Hifter's forces fire into densely populated neighborhoods and even target medical facilities — at least eight times last month, the World Health Organization reported — the forces defending Tripoli have displaced at least 3,100 civilians from Tarhuna and killed over a dozen in Turkish drone attacks last month.

The idea of a meaningful compromise between east and west Libya has become even more far-fetched following Hifter’s dismissal this week of the 2015 U.N.-brokered unity deal.

U.S. Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland said he spoke on Friday to Aguila Saleh, speaker of the east-based parliament, and stressed “the importance of respect for democratic processes" and the U.N.-brokered political process, undermined by Hifter's action.

Meanwhile, as the intractable conflict and the coronavirus pandemic loom over Libya, the migrants who pass through the war-torn coastal country hoping to get to Europe are uniquely vulnerable.

On Friday, the U.N. migration agency said 51 migrants, including three women and two children, were intercepted by the Libyan Coast Guard in the Mediterranean Sea and returned to the western city of Zawiya. Some 30 people, among them a pregnant woman, were taken to a detention center, while the rest managed to escape, according to IOM spokeswoman Safa Msehli.

Libya, a major conduit for migrants fleeing war and poverty across Africa and the Middle East, is notorious for its crowded detention centers run by militias and rife with abuse. Over 1,500 migrants are currently detained, according to the IOM.

With temperatures rising and the war worsening, the U.N. refugee agency has reported an increase in migrant departures from Libya despite a lack of rescue missions along the precarious central Mediterranean route. All charity rescue vessels have halted operations because of COVID-19 restrictions, while Malta has announced its resources are too strained by the pandemic to conduct rescues.

[anatta]

It may be the closest thing to a foreign-policy success that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has had in years: Turkey’s intervention in Libya’s civil war has seemingly turned the tide in favor of the side he is backing. After a string of military successes by the Government of National Accord, the rebel commander Khalifa Haftar has been obliged to offer — under the convenient cover of Ramadan — a truce.

There is no doubt where the credit is due. The GNA was down and very nearly out at the end of last year, when Erdogan decided to provide military assistance. Haftar’s forces controlled most of the country; although the government of Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj had international recognition, its writ ran not much beyond Tripoli. It seemed a matter of months, perhaps even weeks, before the rebels took the capital.

Turkish troops and arms — and a large contingent of Syrian fighters answering to Ankara — have allowed the GNA to take the fight to the rebels. In critical theaters of the conflict, the besiegers are now the besieged, with the GNA rejecting Haftar’s truce offer.

This reversal is doubly impressive when you consider the array of Haftar’s allies: Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have provided him with substantial military support, and Russian fighters have acted as “force multipliers.”

But Erdogan has little room to savor the vindication of his decision —unpopular with his own people — to intervene in Libya. Imposing an ever larger toll on Turkey, the coronavirus crisis is drowning out any discussion of foreign policy. For Turks paying close attention to their president’s military gambits, the successes on Libyan battlefield are also overshadowed by the stalemate in Syria.

Besides, Turkey is still a long way from being able to declare victory in Libya. If Erdogan’s goal was to force Haftar into negotiations with the GNA, that remains a mirage in the Libyan desert. Sarraj, apparently buoyed by his troops’ improved fortunes, has himself ruled out parleys. In any case, Haftar would have to suffer many more military blows before he will entertain meaningful talks.

That will require time, and far greater Turkish resources. If Turkey’s economy continues to deteriorate, voices in Ankara and Istanbul will express concern about the Libyan adventure’s cost. And Erdogan is coming under sharp attack at home for his handling of the economy.

He may be counting on his alliance with the GNA to expand opportunities for oil exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet even if he can navigate past European, Israeli and Egyptian opposition, no revenues will materialize for years to come. Talk of Turkish companies capitalizing on the Libyan market is, at best, premature.

Moreover, fantasies of an economic dividend from the intervention in Libya are hard to entertain when the news at home is so unremittingly grim. Turkey already has more cases of coronavirus than any country outside the U.S. and Western Europe. The impact on the economy, the largest in the Middle East, has been devastating. The lira is near its all-time low to the U.S. dollar. The government’s ability to goose economic activity is limited: Interest rates are effectively near zero.

With foreign-exchange reserves perilously low and Erdogan resolved not to approach the International Monetary Fund for a loan, Turkey is holding out for currency swaps with the U.S. Federal Reserve and other European central banks.

Under the circumstances, Erdogan can’t afford a greater commitment to Libya. His only consolation is that Haftar’s backers face economic difficulties, too: The UAE and Egypt (which, along with Saudi Arabia, are the Arab world’s three largest economies) are reeling from the effects of the pandemic. Russia, too, is feeling the strain.

But Haftar's backers, especially the Egyptians and Emiratis, who are regional rivals of the Turks, will not allow him to fail: When the opportunity arises, they will likely provide him with more resources, so he can fight back. The contest for Libya is a long way from over. At least for now, however, Erdogan can savor some quiet — and rare — satisfaction from a foreign-policy call that seems to be going right.

[anatta]

14 MiG-29 fighter jets and SU-24 fighter bombers that were flown in by the Russian military, landing at Libya's Jufra air base.

The base is the main forward airfield for Khalifa Haftar and his eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA), which has been waging an offensive to capture Tripoli.

Hadfield said Russia's activities in Libya gave it access to that country's oil and a military base in striking distance of Europe.

A big U.S. concern would be if Russia placed missiles in such a location, he added.

Russia has denied links to the aircraft, calling the claim "stupidity." Viktor Bondarev, the former Russian Air Force chief who heads the Defense Committee in the upper house of parliament, said the planes were not Russian, but could be Soviet-era aircraft owned by other African countries.

Hadfield disputed that, saying there were none of those aircraft in that part of Africa. And, he said, "not only did we watch them fly from Russia by way of Iran and Syria to Libya, we were able to photograph them at multiple points."

AFRICOM first released information about the arrival of the Russian aircraft in Libya on May 26.
It provided more details on May 27, saying Moscow deployed the jets and bombers to provide support for Russian mercenaries helping Haftar battle forces of the Government of National Accord (GNA), which is recognized by the United Nations.

AFRICOM said that MiG-29s and Su-24s bearing Russian Federation Air Force markings departed Russia "over multiple days in May."

After the aircraft landed at the Russian military base of Hmeimim in western Syria, the MiG-29s "are repainted and emerge with no national markings."

Hadfield said the fighter aircraft will likely provide close air support and offensive strikes for the Vagner Group, a private military contractor believed to be close to the Kremlin that has been helping Hafter's forces.

The aircraft have not yet been used, but he said they will have to be flown either by pilots from Russia or contractors employed by Vagner.

Also on May 29 the U.S. State Department announced that Malta on May 26 seized $1.1 billion worth of counterfeit Libyan currency that it said was printed by a Russian state-owned company.

The money was printed by Joint Stock Company Goznak and ordered by "an illegitimate parallel entity," State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said in the statement.

The statement said the influx of Russian-printed Libyan currency in recent years "has exacerbated Libya's economic challenges," adding that the United States remained committed to working with the United Nations and international partners to deter illicit activities in Libya.



Libya was plunged into chaos when a NATO-backed uprising toppled longtime dictator Muammar Qaddafi in 2011.
The country is now split between a government in the east allied with Hafter and the UN-backed GNA in Tripoli.

The Russian Foreign Ministry says the situation in Libya is continuing to deteriorate and that a cease-fire announced in January is in tatters.

The cease-fire "has definitively collapsed, and hostilities have resumed in full," ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on May 29, according to Interfax.

The balance of power differs significantly from what it was when the cease-fire came into effect due to "massive foreign assistance," she said.

Russia is in contact with all sides in the conflict and will insist it is resolved through diplomatic means, she said.
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-libya.../30642879.html

[anatta]

^ Russian jets are possible, but that would be another tit -for -tat matching NATO allie Turkey's sending drones and fighters to the GNA/ Libyan battlefield is now high tech *my comment*

[anatta]

[anatta]

The west’s Libya policy is strengthening its adversaries
https://www.ft.com/content/4fe4ad2e-...2-cbd9b7e28ee6


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https://www.ft.com/content/4fe4ad2e-...2-cbd9b7e28ee6

When Libyans rose against the dictatorship of Muammer Gaddafi in 2011, a Nato air campaign led by Europeans rolled back a regime offensive in the east of the oil-rich country. The ersatz institutions Gaddafi erected over 40 years of tyranny imploded with his regime. But, for the most part, the west left dozens of militias, tribal paramilitary and jihadi groups to fill the vacuum. Now, powerful external actors are locked in an escalation that looks unlikely to bring stability, fielding mercenaries and flouting a UN-mandated arms embargo.

The current chapter in Libya’s mayhem began with an offensive launched in April last year by Khalifa Haftar, a renegade commander based in eastern Libya, to capture the capital city of Tripoli, held by the UN-recognised Government of National Accord, which is led by Fayez al-Sarraj. General Haftar, a former Gaddafi officer who turned on his leader, gradually built up his self-styled Libyan National Army, with powerful backing not just from Russia and Kremlin-linked mercenaries but from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and (to an extent) Saudi Arabia.

The tide turned against him this year after Turkey swung behind Tripoli and the GNA. Last month, deploying anti-missile batteries and drones, Ankara helped the Sarraj government recapture from the LNA the strategic al-Watiya air base south-west of Tripoli.

The situation begins to look like Idlib, where Russia and the Assad forces clashed with Turkey and its Syrian proxies in late-February. But Libya is being Syrianised another way. Thousands of Syrian fighters are ranged on both sides: Turkey’s Syrian militia clients for the Tripoli government and pro-Assad militia with Gen Haftar. After al-Watiya fell, Moscow upped the stakes by flying Russian jet fighters from an air base in Syria to eastern Libya, risking direct conflict with Turkey.

Is any of this in the interests of Libyans? Stephanie Williams, acting UN envoy for Libya, told the Security Council last month “the Libyans themselves are getting lost in the mix” of this escalation and “massive influx of weaponry”.

Turkey and Russia’s goals are more about self-interest than Libya’s wellbeing. Turkey last year signed a maritime boundaries deal with the government in Tripoli. The GNA, product of a stillborn UN peace deal in 2015, is weak and often beholden to a shifting array of militias. Ankara is trading its support for a maritime agreement it hopes will reinforce its claim to oil and gas riches in the eastern Mediterranean (resisted by Greece, Cyprus and the EU).

On the other side, Russia, its taste whetted by success in Syria, could end up with a useful foothold on the EU and Nato’s southern front by supporting Gen Haftar. The Arab coalition behind the general is deeply hostile to Turkey meddling in Arab affairs, especially since Ankara is backed by Qatar, the gas-rich emirate they have blockaded since 2017.

Gen Haftar first won the support of Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia by claiming to be devoted to the fight against jihadism Arguably, it is the former CIA collaborator’s lust for absolute power that is the biggest obstacle to peace and stability in Libya. His assent this week to another UN ceasefire follows military setbacks and is likely to be no more than a pause.

The role of France has also been delicate. Paris has tried to conciliate the two sides but has favoured Gen Haftar, and surreptitiously backed him with arms and special forces. In France’s eyes, the chaos in Libya is a major stimulant of illegal migration to Europe, and feeds the spread of jihadi extremism.

An EU-policed maritime embargo on arms to Libya is not only ineffective. It is likely to favour the general, who gets much of his resources overland. This is not just the EU in another muddle. In Syria as in Libya, the west keeps pursuing policies that end up strengthening adversaries such as Russia and wobbly allies like Turkey.

...

[Farah]

Turkiye backed legimate Libyan government forces swept US-Russia-China-Europe-UAE-Egypt-Israel backed Libyan coup terrorist Hafter forces.

Turkish Airforces plays a big role in victory by neutralizing mobile troops and air defence systems and air units of Russia-Israel-China.

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turk...ciples/1880912

[anatta]

Turkiye backed legimate Libyan government forces swept US-Russia-China-Europe-UAE-Egypt-Israel backed Libyan coup terrorist Hafter forces.

Turkish Airforces plays a big role in victory by neutralizing mobile troops and air defence systems and air units of Russia-Israel-China.

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turk...ciples/1880912

just because its a UN backed government; doesn't mean it's legitimate .
GNA has no popular support outside of Tripoli

It's the same thing that happened to the NTC that came out of Bengazi/east to go after Qaddafi.
No popular support and that government collapsed because of it

The only reason the GNA survives Hiftar's attack, is because of the great powers in the war