https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flint_water_crisis#Inquiries.2C_investigations.2C_and_resignations
Inquiries, investigations, and resignations[edit]
One focus of inquiry is when Snyder became aware of the issue, and how much he knew about it.[51] In a July 2015 email, Dennis Muchmore (then Snyder's chief of staff) wrote to a Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) official: "I'm frustrated by the water issue in Flint. I really don't think people are getting the benefit of the doubt. These folks are scared and worried about the health impacts and they are basically getting blown off by us (as a state we're just not sympathizing with their plight)."[51][52] In a separate email sent on July 22, 2015, MDHHS local health services director Mark Miller wrote to colleagues that it "Sounds like the issue is old lead service lines."[52] These emails were obtained under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act by Virginia Tech researchers studying the crisis, and were released to the public in the first week of January 2016.[52]
On October 21, 2015, Snyder announced the creation of a five-member Flint Water Advisory Task Force, consisting of Ken Sikkema of Public Sector Consultants and Chris Kolb of the Michigan Environmental Council (co-chairs) and Dr. Matthew Davis of the University of Michigan Health System, Eric Rothstein of the Galardi Rothstein Group and Dr. Lawrence Reynolds of Mott Children's Health Center in Flint.[53] In December 29, 2015, the Task Force released its preliminary report, saying that the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) bore ultimate blame for the Flint water crisis.[54][55] The task force wrote that the DEQ's Office of Drinking Water and Municipal Assistance (ODWMA) adopted a "minimalist technical compliance approach" to water safety, which was "unacceptable and simply insufficient to the task of public protection."[54] The task force also found that "Throughout 2015, as the public raised concerns and as independent studies and testing were conducted and brought to the attention of MDEQ, the agency's response was often one of aggressive dismissal, belittlement, and attempts to discredit these efforts and the individuals involved. We find both the tone and substance of many MDEQ public statements to be completely unacceptable."[54] The task force also found that the Michigan DEQ has failed to follow the federal Lead and Copper Rule (LCR).[54] That rule requires "optimized corrosion control treatment," but DEQ staff instructed City of Flint water treatment staff that corrosion control treatment (CCT) would not be necessary for a year.[54] The task force found that "the decision not to require CCT, made at the direction of the MDEQ, led directly to the contamination of the Flint water system."[54]
The task force's findings prompted the resignation of DEQ director Dan Wyant and communications director Brad Wurfel.[56][57] Flint Department of Public Works director Howard Croft also resigned. [58]
On January 8, 2016, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Michigan said that it was investigating.[13]
On January 12, 2016 it was reported that the Environmental Protection Agency stayed silent for four months during the crisis. It claims their water expert, Miguel Del Toral, identified potential problems with Flint’s drinking water in February, confirmed the suspicions in April and summarized the looming problem in a June internal memo. Instead of moving quickly to verify the concerns or take preventative measures, federal officials opted to prod the DEQ to act, EPA Region 5 Administrator Susan Hedman said. Hedman said she sought a legal opinion on whether the EPA could force action, but it wasn’t completed until November. But critics such as Edwards contend EPA Hedman acted with no urgency, even behind the scenes. A week after the June 24 memo was circulated, an email exchange between Hedman and then-Flint Mayor Dayne Walling showed no sense of alarm over the threat to public health and more concern about procedure. When asked about the memo, state Senate Minority Leader Jim Ananich, D-Flint said, “There’s been a failure at all levels to accurately assess the scale of the public health crisis in Flint, and that problem is ongoing,” then added, “However, the EPA’s Miguel Del Toral did excellent work in trying to expose this disaster. Anyone who read his memo and failed to act should be held accountable to the fullest extent of the law.”[59]
Class action lawsuit[edit]
On November 13, 2015, four families filed a federal class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Detroit against Governor Rick Snyder and thirteen other city and state officials, including former Flint Mayor Dayne Walling and ex-emergency financial manager Darnell Earley, who was in charge of the city when the switch to the Flint River was made. The complaint alleges that the officials acted recklessly and negligently, leading to serious injuries from lead poisoning, including autoimmune disorders, skin lesions, and "brain fog."[60][61][62] The complaint says that the officials' conduct was "reckless and outrageous" and "shocks the conscience and was deliberately indifferent to ... constitutional rights."[62]